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3 A failure to communicate: what (if anything) can we
4 learn from the negative income tax experiments?

Karl Widerquist*

Department of Politics, Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford University, UK

7 **Abstract**

8 The U.S. and Canadian governments conducted five negative income tax experiments between 1968
9 and 1980. The labor market findings of these experiments were an advance for understanding the effects
10 of a basic income guarantee, but their conclusiveness is often overstated. A review of nonacademic
11 articles on the experiments reveals poor understanding of the results. One often overlooked cause
12 of this misinterpretation was the failure of researchers to make clear that the experiments could not
13 estimate the demand response and therefore could not estimate the market response to the program.
14 Although the evidence does not amount to an overwhelming case either for or against the basic income
15 guarantee, some important conclusions can be drawn, if they are drawn carefully.

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18 *Keywords:* Basic income; Negative income tax; Experiment; Redistribution

20 Between 1968 and 1980, the U.S. Government conducted four negative income tax ex-
21 periments, and the Canadian government conducted one. The results of these experiments
22 are extremely important to growing debate today about the basic income guarantee (BIG).
23 Although the modern basic income guarantee discussion tends to focus on the basic income
24 (BI) variant of the proposal rather than on the negative income tax (NIT) variant tested in the
25 experiments, the two are similar enough that any conclusive findings from the experiments

* Tel.: +44 7747 864 6580.

E-mail address: karl@widerquist.com.

is of great value for the current discussion.¹ Although the NIT experiments had significant limitations, they yielded results that are extremely important to the current debate and that must be understood properly. This article reviews those results and clears up common misconceptions about them.

More than 200 scholarly articles on these experiments have been published in journals and books (see Bibliography B for an extensive list). Most of these articles were written in the 1970s and 1980s, but a few continue to come out today (O'Connor, 2001; Greenberg et al., 2003; Levine et al., 2004). The debate died down without a clear consensus on what the results of the experiments implied for policy, and the results were widely misinterpreted in the popular media (see Bibliography A for a list of nonacademic articles on the experiments). The experimental results continue to be cited both by supporters and opponents of the redistribution of income as evidence for the workability or the unworkability of a guaranteed income. The experimental results seem to be a political Rorschach test in which an observer's conclusions reveal more about the observer than about the observed.

For example, in 1993, long after the results were in and the initial flurry of articles was over, Hum and Simpson declared in the *Journal of Labor Economics*, "Few adverse effects have been found to date. Those adverse effects found, such as work response, are smaller than would have been expected without experimentation" (Hum and Simpson, 1993a). But in the same issue, Anderson and Block (1993) mused about why so many social scientists continue to support the negative income tax "in the face of an avalanche of negative results" provided by the experiments. The most important reason for this disagreement is that the general result of the experiment was what everyone expected: all else equal, the treatment group worked less than the control group. This agreed; the central question was how much less would the treatment group work? Along with many other statistics, the experiments provided numerical estimates of that answer. The estimates required not only quantitative evaluation of their accuracy, but also qualitative interpretation of their meaning and that inspires widely differing opinions. Perceptions of the experiments in the media and in the political arena have been confused and superficial; neither the results nor the disagreements about how to interpret the results were understood by politicians or the media.

This paper focuses on the labor market findings of the NIT experiments arguing that although the experiments were an advance for social science and for understanding the effects of a basic income guarantee, the conclusiveness of the labor-market results is often overstated. Researchers either presented their research as more conclusive than it was or failed to prevent the lay audience from making that misperception. One often overlooked cause of this misinterpretation was the failure of researchers to make clear that the experiments could not estimate the demand response and therefore could not estimate the market response to an NIT. Although the evidence does not amount to an overwhelming case either for or against the basic income guarantee, some important conclusions can be drawn, if they are drawn carefully.

¹ I use the terms "basic income guarantee" and "guaranteed income" to mean any policy that ensures some minimum level of income for all citizens. "Basic income" ensures a minimum income by paying *everyone* regardless of their private income. The "negative income tax" ensures a minimum income by paying *anyone* whose private income slips below a certain level.

65 Part one summarizes the operation of the experiments. Part two discusses the limits
66 of the experiments for drawing conclusions for a national policy. Part three discusses the
67 labor market findings of the experiments in light of their limitations. Part four discusses the
68 political and media perceptions of the experiments. Part five concludes with a summary of
69 the lessons of the experiments both for the basic income guarantee and for the dissemination
70 of statistical research to a lay audience.

71 1. The experiments

72 The five experiments conducted in the United States and Canada are known collectively
73 as “the income maintenance experiments,” “the guaranteed income experiments,” or “the
74 negative income tax (NIT) experiments.” They began at a time when the elimination of
75 poverty was the stated goal of the presidential administration, when there was a growing
76 movement for economic rights, and when many social scientists and policymakers believed
77 that social policy reform was heading in the direction of a guaranteed income. But by the
78 time all of the results were available the movement for eliminating poverty had dwindled
79 and the idea of “welfare reform” was beginning to be associated with dismantling rather
80 than rationalizing the welfare system.

81 The NIT experiments were the first large-scale social experiment to use the scientific
82 method of randomly assigning human subjects into treatment and control groups just as
83 medical researchers do when testing drugs. Some social scientists have called them, “ex-
84 periments in how to conduct experiments,” and it is arguable that they had larger influence
85 on future social experiments than in the examination of the policy they were designed to
86 test.

87 The primary aim of the NIT experiments was to test the side effects rather than the effects
88 of a basic income guarantee. The central goal of an income support program is to raise the
89 welfare of the destitute, and that it can do that is something that does not need to be tested.
90 Although the effect on poverty of most social policies (AFDC, TANF, EITC, job training,
91 education, etc.) requires testing, the conclusion that an NIT with a guarantee rate at the
92 poverty line can eliminate poverty is true by definition.

93 The effects of the negative income tax on health, homeownership, low-birthweight,
94 school performance, and other indicators of the well-being of recipients were tested and
95 reported in many studies (Avrin, 1980; Boumol, 1974, 1977; Bradbury, 1978, 1986; Cain,
96 1977; Elesh and Lefcowitz, 1977; Hanusheck, 1986; Kaluzny, 1979; Keeley, 1980c, 1980d;
97 Kehrer and Wolin, 1979; Kerachsky, 1977; Knudsen et al., 1977a,b; Ladinsky and Wells,
98 1977; Lefcowitz and Elesh, 1977; Mallar, 1977; Masters, 1978; Maynard, 1977; Metcalf,
99 1977a; Michael, 1978; Middleton and Allen, 1977; Murnane et al., 1981; Nicholson, 1977b;
100 O’Connor et al., 1979; Ohls, 1980; Poirier, 1977a,b,c; Pozdena and Johnson, 1980; Rea,
101 1977; Robins, 1980b; Rossi, 1975; Thoits and Hannan, 1980; Weiss et al., 1980; Wooldridge,
102 1977). Most of these studies show positive effects, even for hard-to-change variables such
103 as school performance and low birthweight, but discussion of these effects is beyond the
104 scope of this paper. For an overview of some of these effects see Levine et al. (2004).

105 Another side effect, the effect of the experiments on the divorce rate inspired a large
106 amount of controversy (Bishop, 1980; Cain, 1986; Galligan and Bahr, 1978; Ellwood,

107 1986; Groeneveld et al., 1980a,b, 1983; Hannan et al., 1977, 1978; Hum and Choudry,
108 1992; Tuma, 1986, but these findings are also beyond the scope of this paper). See Hannan
109 and Tuma (1990) and Cain and Wissoker (1990a,b) for two sides of this debate.

110 Table 1 summarizes the basic facts of the five NIT experiments. The first, the New Jersey
111 Graduated Work Incentive Experiment (sometimes called the New Jersey-Pennsylvania
112 Negative Income Tax Experiment or simply the New Jersey Experiment), was conducted
113 from 1968 to 1972. The researchers originally planned to conduct the entire experiment in
114 New Jersey, but they were unable to find enough poor whites there and had to open a second
115 location in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania to round out a racially representative sample. The
116 treatment group originally consisted of 1216 people and dwindled to 983 (due to drop outs)
117 by the conclusion of the experiment. The sample size consisted of black, white, and Latino,
118 two-parent families with incomes below 150% of the poverty line, and with a male “head,”
119 who was not approaching retirement.² Treatment group recipients received a guaranteed
120 income for 3 years.

121 The Rural Income Maintenance Experiment (RIME) was conducted in rural parts of
122 Iowa and North Carolina from 1970 to 1972. It functioned largely as a rural supplement to
123 the New Jersey Experiment, which focused on an urban population. RIME began with 809
124 experimental subjects and finished with 729. The treatment group received a guaranteed
125 income for 2 years. Subjects met the same criteria as the New Jersey Experiment except
126 that single-parent, female-headed households were also included. Few, if any, Latinos were
127 included in the sample. Both RIME and the New Jersey Experiment began under the direc-
128 tion of Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and were completed by the Department of
129 Health, Education, and Welfare when OEO was abolished.

130 The largest NIT experiment was the Seattle/Denver Income Maintenance Experiment
131 (SIME/DIME), which had an experimental group of about 4800 people in the Seattle and
132 Denver metropolitan areas. The sampled included black, white, and Latino, families with
133 at least one dependent and incomes below \$11,000 for single-parent families and below
134 \$13,000 for two-parent families. The experiment began in 1970 and was originally planned
135 to be completed within 6 years. Later, researchers obtained approval to extend the experiment
136 for 20 years for a small group of subjects. This would have extended the project into the
137 early 1990s, but it was eventually cancelled in 1980, so that a few subjects had a guaranteed
138 income for about 9 years, during part of which time they were led to believe they would
139 receive it for 20 years.

140 The Gary Income Maintenance Experiment (which is never abbreviated) was conducted
141 between 1971 and 1974. Subjects were mostly black, single-parent families living in Gary,
142 Indiana. The experimental group received a guaranteed income for 3 years. It began with a
143 sample size of 1799 families, which (due to a large drop-out rate) fell to 967 by the end of
144 the experiment.

145 The Canadian government initiated the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment
146 (Mincome) in 1975 after most of the U.S. experiments were winding down. The sample
147 included 1300 urban and rural families in Winnipeg and Dolphin, Manitoba with incomes

² Husbands were usually the primary income earners in a family, and researchers tended to describe this role with the status-implying term “head of household.” Women could not be “heads” unless they lived with children and without a husband.

Table 1
Summary of the negative income tax experiments in the U.S. and Canada

Name	Location(s)	Data collection	Sample size: initial (final)	Sample characteristics	<i>G</i> *	<i>t</i> **
The New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment (NJ)	New Jersey and Pennsylvania	1968–1972	1216 (983)	Black, white, and Latino, two-parent families in urban areas with a male head aged 18–58 and income below 150% of the poverty line	0.5	0.3
					0.75	0.5
					1.00	0.7
					1.25	
The Rural Income-Maintenance Experiment (RIME)	Iowa and North Carolina	1970–1972	809 (729)	Both two-parent families and female-headed households in rural areas with income below 150% of poverty line	0.5	0.3
					0.75	0.5
					1.00	0.7
					1.25	
The Seattle/Denver Income-Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME)	Seattle and Denver	1970–1976 (some to 1980)	4800	Black, white, and Latino families with at least one dependant and incomes below \$1100 for single parents, \$13,000 for two parent families	0.75	0.5
					1.26	0.7
					1.48	0.7–0.025y 0.8–0.025y
					0.75	0.4
The Gary, Indiana Experiment (Gary)	Gary, Indiana	1971–1974	1799 (967)	Black households, primarily female-headed, head 18–58, income below 240% of poverty line	0.75	0.4
The Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment (Mincome)	Winnipeg and Dauphin, Manitoba	1975–1978	1300	Families with, head younger than 58 and income below \$13,000 for a family of four	1.0	0.6
					C\$3800	0.35
					C\$4800	0.5
					C\$5800	0.75

Sources: Robins et al. (1980a,b), Ferber and Hirsch (1978) and Hum and Simpson (1993a).

* *G* = the guarantee level.

** *t* = the marginal tax rate.

below C\$13,000 (Canadian) per year. By the time the data collection was completed in 1978, interest in the guaranteed income was seriously on the wane and the Canadian government cancelled the project before the data was analyzed. Fortunately, university-based researchers were eventually able to obtain and analyze the data, so that results are available today (Hum and Simpson, 1991, 1993a).

Two parameters are central to the design of any guaranteed income. The first is the guarantee level or the minimum income level (G in Table 1), which is the amount the recipient receives if she has no private income. Theoretically, the guarantee level can be any number between zero and per capita GDP. If G is too low, the NIT will not significantly reduce poverty or increase income security, if it is too high, it will have such strong work disincentive effects that the program would be unaffordable. The experiments intended to find out whether a guarantee level sufficient to seriously reduce or even eliminate poverty was feasible. For that reason guarantee levels between 50% and 150% of the poverty line were tested.

The U.S. experiments all defined the guarantee level relative to the poverty line, testing nine different guarantee levels: 0.5 (50% of the poverty level) was tested in the New Jersey and Rural Income Maintenance Experiments; 0.75 was tested in all four of the U.S. experiments; 1.0 (just enough to eliminate official poverty) was tested in all of the U.S. experiments except SIME/DIME; 1.25 was tested in only in the New Jersey Experiment, and 1.26 and 1.48 were tested only in SIME/DIME. Mincome, which defined its guarantee level in Canadian dollars rather than relative to the poverty level, tested guarantee levels of C\$3800, C\$4800, and C\$5800 per year. These levels were near the poverty line at the time.

The other central parameter of any guaranteed income system is the marginal tax rate (t in Table 1), also known as the “take-back rate:”³ the rate at which benefits are reduced as the recipient makes private income.⁴ In other words, the marginal tax rate is the effective income tax rate per dollar of private income for recipients of the negative income tax. A higher marginal tax rate is associated with a lower overall tax-cost of program⁵ but also with greater the work-disincentives, and a greater potential “poverty trap.” A lower marginal tax rate is associated with a greater redistribution of income towards people with incomes above the poverty line. Redistribution to this group might be desirable in terms of equity (as a reward for low-wage workers), but to do so would increase the cost of a program primarily conceived as an anti-poverty policy.⁶ For these reasons, it is important to know what kinds of take-back rates are feasible and the work-disincentive effects of each. The experimenters tested nine different values of t : 0.3 (30%) was tested in the New Jersey and Rural Experiments; 0.35 was tested only in Mincome; 0.4 was tested only in Gary; 0.5 was tested in all of the experiments except Gary; 0.6 was tested only in Gary; 0.7 was tested in the New Jersey Experiment, RIME, and SIME/DIME; 0.75 was tested in Mincome.

³ The practical working of the marginal tax rate is slightly different if the guaranteed income is administered as a basic income rather than as a negative income tax.

⁴ Private income could include interest, dividends, capital gains, etc. But for the participants in these experiments it was overwhelmingly wage income.

⁵ Higher marginal tax rates could be associated with higher taxes costs if the supply of labor had a very high elasticity of substitution, but this was not expected and did not prove true in any of the experiments.

⁶ The basic income movement today puts less stress on the issue of poverty reduction and more stress on broader equity goals that make the issue of spending money on those already above the poverty line is less important.

185 SIME/DIME tested two nonlinear income functions with marginal tax rates of 0.7 minus
186 0.025 times income and 0.8 minus 0.025 times income. The effect of these two nonlinear
187 functions was to impose higher marginal tax rates on lower levels of income and lower
188 marginal tax rates on higher levels of income.

189 The use of so many different rates of G and t , reduced the numbers of subjects receiving
190 each type of treatment, and therefore reduced the statistical reliability of the results for each.
191 Some of this tradeoff is worthwhile to allow for testing of a greater variety of potential
192 parameters, but the experiments might have benefited from more coordinated effort to test
193 a uniform group of widely spaced parameters.

194 **Table 1** summarizes the configuration of the experiments.

195 2. What the experiments could and could not measure

196 Within the context of the work–effort response, there were conceptual questions about
197 which parameters and which effects deserved most concern. Results were reported for
198 income and substitution effects of various levels of G and t , but the most discussed statistic
199 was the simple question of the overall effect of the various treatments on the hours of work
200 of the average recipient, and so I will focus on that here as well. There were also conceptual
201 questions about how findings on work hours should be used: were they important because
202 they represented the shift in the labor supply curve, because they had implications for the
203 tax cost of the program, or because they had implications for the efficiency cost of the
204 program? Overwhelmingly, the concern came to be the overall change in work hours and
205 their effect on the tax cost of an NIT. Economists focused on this issue, even though only
206 the work disincentive effects of the marginal tax rate (not the guarantee rate) represent a
207 true cost in terms of economic efficiency (Hall, 1980a,b).

208 The experiments produced many precise and technical estimates for the effect on hours
209 of work, but what we learned from these estimates is small in comparison to what we simply
210 do not know about the effects of a national program on work hours. Three obstacles (that
211 make it difficult to draw conclusions about national policy) can be understood with reference
212 to **Fig. 1**. First, there was no stated agreement about what level of work disincentive would
213 be considered acceptable. How much of a decrease in H in **Fig. 1** is too much? Second,
214 there were problems with the fallacy of composition. That is, how well the response of the
215 treatment group to the experiment represented the response of a wider population to an
216 actual program. How well does the experimental shift from A to B represent the true shift
217 from A to B ? Third, the experiments measured the supply response to an NIT, but they were
218 incapable of measuring the demand response, which made them incapable of determining
219 the market response to an actual program. How much did the estimated shift from A to B
220 differ from the shift from A to C that would determine the final effect on hours and costs?

221 The first two of these problems have been well discussed by the scholars who wrote
222 about these results, but were not well understood in media reports on the experiments. The
223 third received only minor discussion by academics and virtually no discussion in the media
224 or in Congressional testimony. The rest of the section discusses these three problems in
225 more detail.




Fig. 1. The vertical axis shows the wage (W), the horizontal axis shows the hours worked (H). The work disincentive effect causes the supply among the experimental group to shift from S_0 to S_1 . Because the experimental group is small in comparison to the size of the market, the results would reflect a fixed-wage shift in hours worked (at W_A) from point A to point B , which involves only a decline in hours and no increase in the wage. If all workers in the market received the NIT, there would be a movement along the supply curve. The market outcome would go from A to C instead of A to B , increasing the wage to W_C and partially offsetting the decrease in hours worked by difference between H_C and H_B .

2.1. *The lack of an agreed acceptable level of work-disincentive*

Many of the authors who have written on these experiments have complained that there was no criteria laid down for what decline in work–effort would be considered acceptable. Although this fact allowed sides could claim that the results vindicated their beliefs, there are two reasons why this criticism of the experiment is overstated: The experiments did give conclusive answers to several objective questions, and the goal of the experiments was inquiry; they were not expected to be a precursor to immediate implementation if work effort declined by less than a percentage. The NIT was simply a policy that Congress was interested in learning more about, and in that respect there was no need for a simplistic yes-or-no result.

There were, in fact, three objective yes-no questions about the work–effort response that the experiments answered quite well, all of which are very important to the BIG debate: First, would a large number of people respond to an NIT by withdrawing entirely from the labor force? The experiments found no evidence of such behavior. Some of the experimenters said that they were unable to find even a single instance of labor-market withdrawal (Levine et al., forthcoming). Second, would the work–effort response be large enough to threaten the financial viability of an NIT? The experiments found no such evidence. Third, would there be any work–effort response? The experiments found that there was a non-negligible work–effort response.

There is a large range between a negligible work-disincentive and one that is so large that it makes the experiments unaffordable. Most researchers who worked on the experiments were not surprised that the results fell into that range, and it simply means that anyone who

248 reads the results must make a judgment about them. That judgment is a matter of an opinion,
249 about which people are likely to disagree. Therefore, the experiments gave both sides the
250 ability to judge the results favorably.

251 2.2. *The fallacy of composition and the representativeness of the experiments*

252 The representativeness of the experimental results was affected both by sampling and
253 by the extent to which the experiments could replicate an actual policy change.

254 The experiments did not draw a random sample of data. Only low-income families were
255 tested; most of the experiments sampled only families with incomes below 150% of the
256 poverty line. Gary and SIME/DIME sampled higher income participants but only in small
257 numbers. Because only low-income families were tested, most of the experimental families
258 did not have the kind of jobs that gave them a reason to stay committed to the labor force.
259 Such families have a greater incentive and a greater ability to withdraw from the labor force
260 than families with better paying, more secure jobs. This method of drawing the sample does
261 not make the experiments “wrong” it merely means that they focused on the reaction of the
262 poorest segment of the labor force, and must be read accordingly. Moffitt (1979b) estimated
263 that the labor supply response of eligible low-income individuals would be -4.5% but the
264 response of the labor market as a whole would be only -1.6% . However, it should be noted
265 that a response by higher-income people, if there is one, has greater effect both for the
266 efficiency cost and the tax cost of an NIT.

267 Participants were not randomly assigned to treatment groups. In order to reduce the costs
268 of the experiments, the researchers tended to assign those with higher pretax incomes more
269 generous programs (higher levels of G and lower t). This strategy enters an important bias
270 into the estimated responses to these parameters.

271 Many of the results are not attributable to the NIT per se but to the fact that most of the NIT
272 plans tested were more generous than the existing welfare programs that the control group
273 was eligible for (Robins and West, 1980b). Burtless (1986) observed that the average tested
274 program was much larger than anything likely to be introduced and therefore overstated
275 the work–effort response. The question of whether an NIT system or conditional welfare
276 system or a similar size would have a larger work disincentive is still unanswered.

277 Few if any single, childless individuals were sampled. This is the group might have a
278 larger work–effort response, because (aside from Food Stamps) they were not eligible for
279 any non-work-based benefits, as parents were at the time.

280 The experiments measured the short-run response to a temporary change in policy, but
281 we really want to know the long run response to a permanent change in policy. This prob-
282 lem could mean that the experiments either overestimated or underestimated the work-
283 disincentive effect. As Harold Watts described it, an experimental plan that recipients know
284 will be in place for only a few years, is the equivalent of putting leisure time on sale: When
285 laundry soap is on sale, people buy more of it, and we can expect a similar response when
286 leisure is on sale. People, who might want to take a few weeks or months off work sometime
287 in the next 10 years, might as well take it while the experiment is going on (Levine et al
288 forthcoming). On the other hand, because the experiments were only temporary, recipients
289 knew that they had to return to the workforce eventually, and might have been less likely to
290 drop out for fear of losing work experience or losing their place in line for promotion. It is

291 questionable whether many of the recipients had jobs that elicited such loyalty to the labor
292 market, but arguably a permanent NIT could give workers a disincentive toward building
293 the kind of attachments to the labor force that might lift them well out of the bottom of
294 the income distribution later in life. The possibilities for biases in either direction do not
295 necessarily cancel each other out, but they do show that those who make claims that the
296 long-run effect is certainly larger than the experimental effect (Burtless, 1986; Anderson
297 and Block, 1993) are making claims that are not supported by evidence or theory.

298 Metcalf (1974), Ashenfelter (1978) and Robins (1984) discussed the problem of limited-
299 duration experiments and efforts to solve it. The best evidence on this issue provided by the
300 experiments comes from the SIME/DIME “20-year” recipients. It is unclear whether these
301 recipients believed the experiment would last for 20 years, and they would have been wise
302 not to, as it was cancelled after 9 years. These recipients did not behave terribly different
303 from other experimental group (Robins, 1984), but even if the experiment had gone on for
304 the full 20 years it could not have estimated everything we want to know about long-term
305 and cultural effects of an NIT.

306 Other problems included Hawthorne effects, complicated experimental rules, attrition,
307 and underreporting of income by the experimental group. Hawthorne effects are changes
308 in behavior that resulting from being watched and/or from trying to influence outcome
309 of an experiment. Ferber and Hirsch (1978) argued that many participants did not seem
310 to understand the eligibility rules. Attrition is likely to lead to bias towards exaggerating
311 the value of the work-disincentive effects because those who worked the least had the
312 most to gain by remaining in the experiment. Underreporting is important because the
313 control group had no incentive to misrepresent their private income, while the experimental
314 group did (Greenberg et al., 1981). They may also have had a greater ability to get away
315 with underreporting than they would if an actual policy were in place. Ashenfelter (1986)
316 speculates that underreporting might have been the main cause of the difference in reported
317 income between the control and experimental groups, which would greatly bias the results
318 toward over estimation of the work-disincentive effects.

319 2.3. *The inability of the experiments to measure the demand response*

320 The researchers involved were clearly aware of the absence of a demand response and
321 of its theoretical importance, but with few exceptions (such as Browning, 1971; Greenberg,
322 1983) it received little attention in the literature. To determine the market effect, researchers
323 would have to know the elasticities both of labor supply (which the experiments estimated)
324 and of labor demand (which the experiments could not estimate). The following analysis
325 assumes no unemployment. If unemployed workers replace the work reductions for NIT
326 recipients, the effect of an NIT on total labor hours, output, and the efficiency cost of an
327 NIT will be mitigated, but the effect on the labor hours of recipients and on the tax cost will
328 not be mitigated.⁷

329 Examining the extreme cases reveals the range of possible outcomes. Fig. 2 shows
330 the effects of a completely inelastic demand for labor. In this case, firms need a fixed

⁷ See Greenberg (1983) for a more detailed discussion of this issue in the context of unemployment.




Fig. 2. If demand is completely inelastic, there is no equilibrium reduction in work hours.

331 amount of workers and will pay whatever they must to get it. If so, no amount of labor-
 332 disincentive effect will cause any long-run decrease in work effort; the entire result of the
 333 work-disincentive effect would be to raise wages; and there would be no equilibrium decline
 334 in hours worked and no efficiency cost. Fig. 3 shows that, if the demand for labor is perfectly
 335 elastic (if firms will hire any amount of labor at the going wage, but won't pay even a cent
 336 more for it), the market equilibrium will be entirely determined by the horizontal shift in
 337 the supply of labor just as measured by the experiments.

338 The more general results are that the equilibrium level of work effort will be somewhere
 339 between the initial equilibrium (point A) and the horizontal shift in supply (point B), and
 340 that the equilibrium wage will be as high or higher than the initial wage. In other words, the
 341 market equilibrium will be somewhere in the shaded area in Fig. 4. Without information
 342 on elasticities, it is impossible to say precisely where in this region the equilibrium would
 343 be. Thus, instead of estimating the equilibrium outcome of a negative income tax, the
 344 experiments estimated *the boundary of a region of possible outcomes*.

345 It should be noted that it is theoretically possible for the equilibrium point to be in
 346 the region to the upper left of point B if the labor supply is backward bending. However,
 347 backward bending requires that workers' demand for goods is so inelastic that a decrease in




Fig. 3. If demand is completely elastic, there is no change in the wage, and the full reduction in work hours in the experiments would occur in the market.




Fig. 4. The range of possible market responses to a given horizontal shift in the supply of labor.

348 wages will cause them to work more hours to maintain their level of consumption. That is
 349 quite reasonable for someone whose labor is the primary or the only source of income. But
 350 if a generous guaranteed income is in place, a lower wage reduces the portion of income
 351 attributable to work. It becomes unlikely that workers will work more and more to maintain
 352 the level of a smaller and small part of their income. Therefore, it is unlikely that labor
 353 supply would backward bend for workers in the low wage market when a substantial NIT
 354 exists. Also, if it did exist it would be likely to lead to a very large increase in wages as the
 355 backward bending supply forced the price farther up the supply curve.

356 If a backward bending labor supply is ruled out, the lack of ability of the experiments to
 357 estimate the market response to a guaranteed income has several important effects on the
 358 estimates:

- 359 ● The reduction in labor hours would be smaller than estimated by the experiments.
- 360 ● The increase in income of recipients (and therefore) the effect of the program on poverty
 361 would be larger than estimated (via increased wage rates).
- 362 ● The cost of the program in terms of tax dollars would be smaller than estimated.
- 363 ● The efficiency loss of the program would be smaller than estimated.
- 364 ● The increase in wages would create a cost to firms that the experiments could not estimate.

365 In other words, the experiments found upper-bound estimates for the decline in hours
 366 worked, lower-bound estimates for the effect of the program on the income of recipients,
 367 upper-bound estimates for the cost of the program in terms of tax dollars and efficiency
 368 loss, and no estimate of the cost of the guaranteed income in terms of higher wages.⁸

369 Given this inherent limitation of the experiments, there are two reasonable ways to
 370 present results: One is to obtain the best available estimates for the elasticities and simulate
 371 the outcome (Betson et al., 1980, 1981; Betson and Greenberg, 1983; Greenberg, 1983).
 372 The other is to present them as what they were: estimates of the boundaries of a range of
 373 possibilities. Instead, as shown in Section 3, demand effects were sometimes ignored and
 374 often treated with a small caveat. When treated with a caveat it was often included on a
 375 list of things that could bias the estimates, such as factors mentioned in Section 2.2, but

⁸ This is not an economic cost, of course. But it is a cost to an interest group that might interest policymakers.

376 few brought attention to the important difference between those biases and the difference
377 between a point estimate and an estimate of the boundary of a range.

378 3. The work-disincentive results of the experiments

379 Nearly half of the scholarly articles on the negative income tax experiments deal in some
380 way with empirical results for work incentive effects, and many of those present original
381 estimates. Table 2 summarizes the findings of several of the studies on the work–effort
382 response to the NIT experiments, giving the difference in hours worked by the experimental
383 group relative to the control group in hours per year and in percentage terms. Results are
384 reported for three categories of workers, husbands, wives, and “single female heads” (SFH).⁹
385 Data was also collected for the work effort of youths, but is omitted from this table in the
386 interest of brevity.¹⁰ The five experiments found a range of work–effort reduction from
387 –0.5% to –9% for husbands, which corresponds to a reduction of about 0.5–4 h per week,
388 20–130 h per year, or 1–4 fulltime weeks per year. The three studies averaging the results
389 from the four U.S. experiments (Robins, 1985; Burtless, 1986; Keeley, 1981a,b) found work
390 reduction effects of 5%, 7% and 7.9%, respectively.

391 The response of wives and single mothers was somewhat larger in terms of hours, and
392 substantially larger in percentage terms because they tended to work fewer hours to begin
393 with. Wives reduced their work effort by 0–27% and single mothers reduced their work
394 effort by 15–30%. These percentages correspond to reductions of about 0–166 h per year.
395 The labor market response of wives had a much larger range than the other two groups, but
396 this was usually attributed to the peculiarities of the labor markets in Gary and Winnipeg
397 where particularly small responses were found.

398 Robins (1985), Robins and West (1980a,b), and Moffitt (1979a) all clearly present their
399 findings as the difference between the labor supply of the treatment group and the control
400 group, which should avoid any confusion with broader labor market findings to anyone who
401 understands the difference, and one would expect everyone who reads technical articles is
402 likely to understand. Others added a simple caveat (Keeley et al., 1978a; Moffitt, 1979b),
403 but some were not as careful to avoid confusion. Orcutt and Orcutt (1968) claimed that
404 the experiments could produce unbiased estimates of the disincentive effects and earnings
405 effects of an NIT, when the lack of a demand response clearly makes this impossible
406 (Browning, 1971). Ferber and Hirsch (1978, p. 1385) referring to the “labor supply response”
407 as the “labor market response” despite explaining the difference later in the article. Kelly
408 and Singer (1971) write, “No experiment paper should be complete without mention of
409 possible response bias,” but do not mention the experiment’s inability to measure demand
410 response as a source of bias. West (1980b, p. 642) mentions three ways NIT can affect wages
411 without mentioning the demand response. Most of these slips are small, but the omission
412 of demand is more significant when researchers attempt to carry the results over to the cost
413 of a national program.

⁹ Meaning women with children and no husband.

¹⁰ Youths tended to have work–effort responses comparable in percentage terms to wives and single mothers. It was not correlated with an increase in school attendance, but was correlated with an improvement in school performance.

Table 2
Summary of findings of work reduction effect

Study	Data source	Work reduction* in hours per year** and percent			Comments and caveats
		Husbands	Wives	SFH	
Robins (1985)	4 U.S.	-89	-117	-123	Study of studies that does not assess the methodology of the studies but simply combines their estimates. Finds large consistency throughout, and "In no case is there evidence of a massive withdrawal from the labor force." No assessment of whether the work response is large or small or its effect on cost. Estimates apply to a poverty-line guarantee rate with a marginal tax rate of 50%.
Burtless (1986)	4 U.S.	-5% -119	-21.1% -93	-13.2% -79	Average of results of the four US experiments weighted by sample size, except for the SFH estimates, which are a weighted average of the SIME/DIME and Gary results only.
Keeley (1981)	4 U.S.	-7% -7.9%	-17%	-7%	A simple average of the estimates of 16 studies of the four U.S. experiments.
Robins and West (1980a)	SIME/DIME	-128.9	-165.9	-147.1	Estimates "labor supply effects." It goes without saying that this is different from "labor market effects."
Robins and West (1980b)	SIME/DIME	-7% -9%	-25% -20%	-15% -25%	Recipients take 2.4 years to fully adjust their behavior to the new program.
Cain et al. (1974)	NJ	-	-50	-	Includes caveats about the limited duration of the test and the representativeness of the sample. Notes that the evidence shows a smaller effect than nonexperimental studies.
Watts et al. (1974)	NJ	-1.4% to -6.6%	-20%	-	Depending on size of <i>G</i> and <i>t</i> .
Rees and Watts (1975)	NJ	-1.5 hpw**	-0.61%	-	Found anomalous positive effect on hours and earnings of blacks.
Ashenfelter (1978)	RIME	-0.5% -8%	-27%	-	"There must be serious doubt about the implications of the experimental results for the adoption of any permanent negative income tax program."
Moffitt (1979a)	Gary	-3% to -6%	0%	-26% to -30%	No caveat about missing demand, but careful not to imply the results mean more than they do.
Hum and Simpson (1993a)	Mincome	-17	-15	-133	Smaller response to the Canadian experiment was not surprising because of the make-up of the sample and the treatments offered.
		-1%	-3%	-17%	

*The negative signs indicate that the change in work effort is a reduction; **hours per year except where indicated "hpw;" hours per week. NJ, New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment; SIME/DIME, Seattle/Denver Income Maintenance Experiment; Gary, Gary Income Maintenance Experiment; RIME, Rural Income Maintenance Experiment; Mincome, Manitoba Income Maintenance Experiment; SFH, single female "head of household".

414 Table 3 reports some of the labor market findings other than the simple difference
415 between the hours worked by the treatment and control groups. Robins et al. (1980a,b)
416 and Tuma and Robins (1980) found that the percentages are much larger if labor response
417 is considered in terms of the increase in the length of spells out of work or the rate at
418 which people who aren't working return to employment. These results largely reflect the
419 fact that the reduction in labor hours was not primarily caused by workers reducing their
420 hours of work each week but by remaining nonemployed longer if and when they became
421 nonemployed. Increased periods of nonemployment might have an efficiency benefit if they
422 lead to better matches between workers and firms.

423 Several studies estimating the additional tax cost caused by the work–effort response
424 found widely divergent results. Rees and Watts (1975) estimated it would add 5% to 10%
425 to the tax cost of the program. Ashenfelter (1978) estimated that the cost of the program without
426 labor market effects would be 78% of cost with labor market effects, which is equivalent
427 to saying that the reduction in work effort would increase the tax cost of the program by
428 28%. Keeley et al. (1978a) estimated that the labor supply response would account for
429 23–55% of total program costs (equivalent to an increase of 30–122%). Burtless (1986)
430 estimated that work disincentive would nearly triple the tax cost of the program. All of
431 these studies neglect the demand response, implicitly assuming that demand is completely
432 elastic. Rees and Watts's conclusion is that the costs are small and so apparently don't think
433 it necessary to say that a demand response might make the costs even smaller. Only Keeley
434 et al. (1978a,b) explicitly make the assumption of perfectly elastic demand. They admit
435 that this reduces the accuracy of the results, and justify the assumption by speculating that
436 employers could easily replace NIT recipients with workers who are not covered by the
437 program.

438 Most of the studies that did include a demand response used data from the NIT experi-
439 ments to examine particular changes in policy such as Carter's Program for Better Jobs and
440 Income (Betson et al., 1980a,b; Betson and Greenberg, 1983), and so are not very useful for
441 correcting cost estimates of an NIT for demand responses. Only Greenberg (1983) applied
442 a microsimulation model with a demand effect to the cost of an NIT as examined in the
443 experiments. He found that a wage response could slightly mitigate the effect on hours and
444 costs but the general pattern remained in which a dollar spent on poverty reduction raises
445 the incomes of the poor by less than a dollar,¹¹ but his results are tentative because they
446 depended on assumptions about the elasticity of demand, the level of unemployment and
447 the substitutability between NIT recipients and other workers (Greenberg, 1983). Bishop
448 (1979) used a general equilibrium framework to examine the impact of several antipoverty
449 programs including NIT on efficiency. The focus on efficiency rather than tax cost means
450 that his results are not directly comparable to the others, but he finds that the NIT would
451 produce a demand response that would increase wages and therefore it would reduce
452 both the efficiency loss and the tax cost of the program. Unfortunately there do not seem
453 to be any articles employing a demand response in otherwise comparable models that
454 generate comparable estimates of tax cost, hours worked, efficiency lost, and impact on
455 inequality.

¹¹ Personal correspondence.

Table 3
Labor market findings other than simple work–effort reduction

Study	Data source	Findings	Comments and caveats
Robins et al. (1980a,b)	SIME/DIME	Increase in length of spells out of employment: husbands: 9.4 weeks, 27%; wives: 50 weeks, 42%; single females: 56 weeks, 60%	The experimental group was somewhat more likely to leave employment and substantially more like to remain nonemployed for longer spells than the control group.
Tuma and Robins (1980)	SIME/DIME	Change in rate of entering employment: husbands: –22.2, wives: –39.6, single female heads: –35.4	Conditional having become nonemployed. This reflects the fact that the labor-hours reductions were attributable more to longer spells of unemployment than to reductions in weekly hours of work.
Hall (1975)	NJ	Opt out rate: 125-50 plan: 13%; 100-50 plan: 25%; 50-50 plan: 94%	These are the percentages of participants in the study who received no benefits. But the results depend substantially on the participants pre-experimental income.
Robins (1984)	SIME/DIME	Does not find evidence that 3-year and 5-year studies were biased relative to the response of the 20-year treatment group.	The available evidence is limited.
Cogan (1983)	NJ	Husbands reduce labor effort by –5 to –7 h per week, conditional on participation	This estimate was only for the sub-sample of that actually received payments and so is not directly comparable to the estimates of labor response in Table 2.
Moffitt (1979b)	Gary	Eligible low income population: –4.5%	Simulation model, does not take demand into account, but warns, “Assuming the labor-supply curve is forward-sloping, which it probably is at low age rates, the experimental estimates over-state the final impact on employment (due to a demand response).”
		Total population: –1.6%	
		The effect of an NIT on labor supply could be offset by unemployed workers if there is sufficient slack in the labor market.	
Keeley et al. (1978b)	SIME/DIME	Predicted labor supply response of a national program: husbands: –5.3%, wives: –22.0%, SFH: –11.2%	Applies the experimental parameters for labor supply functions to a national data base to obtain estimates of the nationwide aggregate labor effect and so these findings are not directly comparable to those in Table 2. Finds that the results vary wide with the generosity of the program.
Greenberg (1983)	SIME/DIME	Response of the demand for labor had a small mitigating effect on hours.	Results depended on assumptions on the level of unemployment and the elasticities of demand and supply of labor and the substitutability and availability of workers making similar wages to those eligible for NIT.

Keeley et al. (1978a)	SIME/DIME	Labor Supply response accounts for 23–55% of programs with a positive net cost. That is, cost before labor supply response is 45–77% of total cost.	Range depends on the size of G and t . Justifies the assumption of perfectly elastic demand on employers' ability to substitute high-wage, high-skilled workers for workers who are likely to be affected by an NIT.
Robins (1980a)	SIME/DIME	Replacement of the 1974 welfare system with an NIT would have cost an additional \$2.2 billion to \$30 billion (\$55 to \$97 in 2004 dollars). The work–effort response would add \$0.2–\$7.0 billion (\$0.6–\$23 in 2004 dollars) to cost.	Range of responses depends on the size of G and t . Demand response not included.
Rees and Watts (1975)	NJ	Increase tax cost due to supply response: 5–10%	Demand response not included.
Ashenfelter (1978)	RIME	Estimates that the cost before the labor supply response would only 78% of the cost after the labor supply response.	Demand response not included. Findings could be restated to say that the work–effort response adds 28% to the transfer cost.
Burtless (1986)	4 U.S.	\$3 in transfers raises the income of recipients by only \$1. Poverty among all families with children could be eliminated for an additional cost of \$61 billion (\$98 in 2004 dollars).	Demand response not included.
Maxfield	SIME/DIME	Labor supply response is highly correlated to the generosity of the NIT program.	Demand response not included.
Bishop (1979)	SIME/DIME	“Reduction in labor supply produced by these programs does tend to raise low-skill wages, and this improves transfer efficiency.”	General equilibrium model focusing on efficiency effects, and so results are not directly comparable to those focusing on tax cost. Results are sensitive to assumptions.

456 These results are not extremely divergent or controversial, and they are not terribly con-
457 clusive on the issue of whether the government should introduce a basic income guarantee,
458 but they can be spun to make an apparently strong case either for or against it. Most of the
459 scholarly works did not seem to consciously spin the results with a few exceptions such as
460 Burtless (1986) and Anderson and Block (1993). Although Burtless displays knowledge of
461 the difficult issues involve in the experiments, he betrays an effort to nudge the conclusion in
462 direction. He declares a 7% decline in work effort to be “large.” He discusses various biases
463 in the estimation of labor supply that point in both directions, but hastily concludes that the
464 balance the labor supply effects are overestimated, and fails to recognize the significance
465 of underreporting bias (Ashenfelter, 1986). He does not mention that his cost estimate is
466 substantially larger than any of the others, and he does not mention that it is biased by the
467 omission of a demand response. Anderson and Block (1993) seem to use Burtless (1986)
468 as their primary source, but make a one-sided representation even of his account, omitting
469 many of his caveats and clarifications. They go farther than Burtless by attributing poverty
470 to a lifestyle “choice” on the part of recipients because so many people in poverty do not
471 work, ignoring such a basic economic concept as *unemployment*. They ignore the demand
472 side of the labor market, failing to note that poverty also represents the “choice” of employ-
473 ers in the low-wage sector who pay wages that leave workers in poverty even if they work
474 fulltime. Anderson and Block’s normative and positive arguments are both one-sided and
475 therefore not very valuable.

476 Despite these two exceptions, the presentation of the data in the official reports and in
477 most published works was good science and not political spin. But as Section 4 shows, once
478 that data made its way into the public arena, it was spun anyway.

479 4. Political and media perceptions of the experiments

480 Hopefully, Sections 2 and 3 have demonstrated that the findings of the NIT experiments
481 are far more complex, subtle, and ambiguous than one might be led to believe by findings
482 such as an X% decline in hours worked. But as this section shows, the complexity of the
483 results was largely lost on politicians and members of the media to whom the findings were
484 reported. Bibliography A contains a survey of about 50 articles from the popular media on
485 the experiments.

486 The experiments gained significant attention in the press only twice. In 1970–1972, when
487 Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP) was under debate in Congress, and in 1977–1978
488 when Carter’s Program for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) was under consideration. Both
489 plans had elements of a negative income tax; neither was a pure guaranteed income, although
490 FAP was considerably closer to it than PBJI. In 1970, the first experiment had only been
491 under way for 2 years and researchers believed that they were at least 3 years away from
492 being able to produce meaningful results, but at the insistence of the administration and some
493 members of Congress, the researchers released preliminary reports showing no evidence
494 of any work disincentive effect.¹² Some other members of Congress (rightly) could not

¹² The reason that the preliminary reports so greatly underestimated the work–effort reduction was probably that workers took several years to adjust their behavior to the new policy (see Robins and West, 1980b).

495 believe the result, and commissioned a review of the results from an independent auditor
496 that concluded the results were “premature,” which was just what the researchers had initially
497 warned.

498 Results of the fourth and largest experiment, SIME/DIME, were released while Congress
499 was debating PBJI. Dozens of technical reports with large amounts of data were simplified
500 down to two statements: It decreased work effort and it supposedly increased divorce. The
501 small size of the work disincentive effect that pleased so many of the researchers hardly drew
502 any attention. Never mind that everyone going into the experiments agreed that there would
503 be some work disincentive effect; members of Congress were appalled; and columnists
504 across the country responded with a chorus of negative editorials decrying the guaranteed
505 income and ridiculing the government for spending millions of dollars to find out whether
506 people work less if you pay them not to work.

507 The [United Press International \(1977\)](#) simply got the facts wrong saying that the
508 SIME/DIME study showed that “adults might abandon efforts to find work.” The UPI
509 apparently did not understand the difference between a decline in work hours while contin-
510 uing to work, and abandoning the labor market. The Rocky Mountain News claimed that
511 the NIT “saps the recipients’ desire to work.” Jones (1977) writing for the *Seattle Times*
512 presented a relatively well-rounded understanding of the results, but despite this, simply
513 concluded that the existence of a decline in work effort was enough to “cast doubt” on the
514 plan. Similarly Rich (1978, November 18) implied that evidence showing the NIT “might
515 cause recipients to work less” is enough to disqualify the program from consideration.
516 [Raspberry \(1978\)](#) declared the experiments a failure simply because people worked less.

517 Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan who had written a book in support of the guaranteed
518 income a few years early and who had been one of the architects of FAP, recanted his support
519 for the guaranteed income as a result of the SIME/DIME findings. He is a sociologist
520 and would be expected to have a sophisticated understanding of statistical data, but he
521 implied in a letter to William F. Buckley later published by the *National Review* that the
522 mere existence of a work disincentive effect was an important factor in his recantation.
523 He stated, “But were we wrong about a guaranteed Income! Seemingly it is calamitous. It
524 increases family dissolution by some 70%, decreases work, etc. Such is now the state of
525 the science, and it seems to me we are honor bound to abide by it for the moment.” He
526 held Congressional hearings on the results in November of 1978 to discuss the evidence.
527 Although a large amount of good information was presented ([U.S. Senate, 1978](#)), media
528 reports and politicians’ comments on the experiments did not betray a real understanding
529 of the findings.

530 Headlines such as “Income Plan Linked to Less Work,” and “Guaranteed Income Against
531 Work Ethic” appeared in newspapers following the hearings. The [Knight News Service](#)
532 (1978) quoted Jodie Allen of the Labor Department commenting on Spiegelman’s cost
533 estimates saying, “It could easily turn out that the government might spend billions of
534 dollars on benefit payments and have little effect on the families’ incomes. Instead, most of
535 the (government) expenditures would offset reductions in earnings.” Only a few exceptions
536 such as Carl Rowan for the *Washington Star* (1978) considered that it might be acceptable
537 for people working in bad jobs to work less, but he could not figure out why the government
538 would spend so much money to find out whether people work less when you pay them to
539 stay home.

540 Spiegelman, one of the directors of SIME/DIME, defended the experiments in the Wash-
541 ington Star (1978), saying that the experiments provided much needed costs estimates that
542 demonstrated the feasibility of the NIT. He said that the decline in work effort was not
543 dramatic, and could not understand why so many commentators drew such different con-
544 clusions than the experimenters. Demokovich (1978) was one of the few popular writers
545 who considered the work–effort reduction to be small, but the more common reaction was
546 given by Senator Bill Armstrong of Colorado Citing only that a work disincentive effect
547 existed, Armstrong said the experiment was, “An acknowledge failure. Let’s admit it, learn
548 from it, and move on” (Brimberg, 1980).

549 The scientists who presented the data were not entirely to blame for this misunderstanding,
550 as Burtless (1986) remarked, “Policymakers and policy analysts . . . seem far more
551 impressed by our certainty that the efficiency price of redistribution is positive than they
552 are by the equally persuasive evidence that the price is small.” It may be an impossible
553 task to communicate such complexities to an audience interested only in sound bytes or
554 in the bottom line, but social scientists have a responsibility to do a better job than we
555 did in this instance. The understanding of the NIT experiments displayed in the popular
556 press was superficial and obviously the result of spin. Few commentators kept figures like
557 5–7% in perspective. None of the articles in the popular media that I was able to find be-
558 trayed any understanding that the experiments measured only the horizontal shift in the
559 labor supply function. None seemed to understand the elementary economic principle that
560 a change in supply necessitates a demand response that can greatly affect the equilibrium
561 outcome.

562 5. Conclusion

563 It would be very easy to spin on the results in either direction. A positive spin would focus
564 on the size of the work disincentive effects. The experiments clearly contradicted two of the
565 most common arguments against a basic income guarantee: The experiments found *no evi-*
566 *dence* that a negative income tax would cause some segment of the population to withdraw
567 from the labor force, and the experiments found *no evidence* that the supply response would
568 increase the cost of the program to the point that it would be unaffordable (even ignoring the
569 mitigating demand response). Certainly, some level of G would make an NIT untenable, but
570 the results implied that a guarantee level as high as 150% of the official poverty level would
571 be well within the bounds of financial feasibility. Also, the experiments predicted that the
572 full labor market response in the work hours of primary income earners would fall into a
573 range of about 0–5% or 0–7% and where in that range it fell would depend on the elasticity of
574 demand for labor. The reduction in work hours could be called “small,” and it could be men-
575 tioned that it would have the side benefit of increasing wages, further reducing poverty and
576 inequality.

577 A negative spin would require a focus on three facts: First, there was a statistically signif-
578 icant work disincentive effect, allowing willing laypersons to draw the fallacious conclusion
579 that there was therefore a substantively significant work disincentive effect. Second, work
580 reductions of 5–7% among primary earners in two-parent families and reductions of up to
581 27% for other earners could be called “large.” Third, the work disincentive increased the

582 cost of the program over what it would have been if work hours were unaffected by the NIT.
583 Estimates of the added cost vary from 10% to 200%, and it is not difficult to focus on the
584 larger estimates.

585 Even if the public had been made to understand more of the complexities of results,
586 as long as there is a significant political block believing that any work disincentive is
587 unacceptable, the NIT experiments were bound to give ammunition to NIT opponents.
588 To that extent it was a mistake for any guaranteed income supporters to agree to the ex-
589 periments in the first place. Reichauer (1986) asked what would have happened if the
590 introduction of Social Security had been preceded by a similar experiment? It would cer-
591 tainly have shown that people saved less for their retirement, retired sooner than they
592 otherwise would have, and relied less on traditional feelings of family responsibility for
593 elders. Such findings would have challenged prevailing norms and would have given con-
594 siderable ammunition to Social Security opponents. But there is a danger in focusing too
595 much on the strategic value of the experiments to supporters and opponents. There is more
596 to scientific inquiry than political advantage. The experiments were not a propaganda
597 device, and although what we learned from them was tentative and limited, it is worth
598 knowing.

599 Why was the limitation of a missing demand response treated so lightly? Perhaps, as
600 a general trait, scientists like to focus on the results of their research, not its limitations.
601 Perhaps, those presenting the data might have assumed this fact was too obvious to be
602 bothered with among social scientists or too difficult to be dealt with by a lay audience.
603 Perhaps, opponents didn't want to bring it up because it waters down their argument that
604 the work disincentive is "large" and the costs are "high." Perhaps, supporters didn't want to
605 bring it up because it is easier to make the case that the work-disincentive is "small" than
606 to make a case that a work disincentive would have a desirable effect on wages. Using the
607 small argument requires only an objective look at empirical evidence—if one can objectively
608 define small. But using the desirability argument requires not only empirical data that the
609 experiments could not produce, but also a much more complex normative argument. It
610 affronts those who want to keep wages low to keep profits high and those who espouse the
611 extreme version of the work ethic stating that everyone without property must at all times
612 even at poverty wages.

613 To those who believe that low-wage workers need more power in the labor market,
614 the NIT experiments demonstrated the feasibility of a desirable program. To those who
615 believe all work-disincentives are bad, the experiments demonstrated the undesirability
616 of a well-meaning program. These normative issues separate supporters from opponents
617 of the basic income guarantee, and therefore, the NIT experiments, as long as they are
618 discussed, will always mean different things to different people. Either side can spin the
619 results, but that's not how science should be used. It is better to understand that the NIT
620 experiments were able to shed a small amount of light on the positive issues that affect
621 this normative debate. They were able to indicate only that a basic income guarantee is
622 financially feasible at a cost of certain side effects that people with differing political
623 beliefs may take to be desirable or disastrous. To claim more would be to overstate the
624 evidence.

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672 **Bibliography A: A few non-academic articles on the NIT experiments**

673 **Bibliography B: Published academic articles and books on the NIT experiments**¹³

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¹³ I’m sure I missed some. There is some repetition of papers published both as journal articles and as book chapters, and there was some subjectivity in the judgment of what constitutes “largely” and “published”—my apologies for any omissions. In addition to the published articles, there are at least 200 more unpublished memorandums, reports, discussion papers, and other unpublished works on the experiments as well. Many (but not all) of the unpublished articles were simply early version of later published works. For a bibliography including many of the unpublished articles on the NIT experiments, see the working paper version of this article: USBIG Discussion Paper No. 38, “A Failure to Communication: The Labor Market Findings of the Negative Income Tax Experiments and their Effects on Policy and Public Opinion” at <http://www.usbig.net>.

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