AN EFFICIENCY
ARGUMENT FOR THE BASIC INCOME GUARANTEE
Karl Widerquist, Oxford University
Michael A. Lewis, SUNY
School of Social Welfare at Stony Brook
This
paper originally appeared as, “An efficiency argument for the guaranteed
income,” paper no. 212 in the work paper series of the Levy Economics Institute
of Bard College. It was briefly updated in January of 2005.
The welfare reform of 1996 created more need for reform of
the welfare system than ever. The passage of the Social Security Act of 1935
granted impoverished Americans a statutory right to governmental assistance, if
they fell into categorical conditions of need. The plan signed into law by
President Clinton, in addition to turning much of welfare policy over to the
states and strengthening the conditionality of assistance, removed the
guarantee of assistance. Under this new system the needy can simply be turned
away if they appeal to the government for help during hard times.
In this paper, we will make the case that welfare reform
needs to move in the opposite direct, not back toward the pre-1996 system, but
away from conditionality altogether toward a basic income guarantee (BIG). This
policy (in any of its various versions: e.g., negative income tax, basic
income, or the social dividend) is the most efficient and comprehensive method
to attack poverty. In part 1, we define poverty and our goal for poverty
policy. In part 2, we critically examine five theories of the causes of
poverty: the physical inability to work, single parenthood, inadequate demand
for labor, inadequate human capital, and a poor work ethic. In part three we
critically discuss six policy strategies for fighting poverty: promotion of
economic growth, workfare, the minimum wage, separating the “deserving” from
the “undeserving” poor, publicly guaranteed employment, and publicly guaranteed
income. We assess how well each of these programs address
the five proposed causes of poverty, making the case that the most efficient
and effective of these is the basic income guarantee.
THE DEFINITION OF
POVERTY AND THE GOAL OF POVERTY POLICY
Although
the goal one has for policy is closely linked to the particular policy one
chooses to achieve that goal, it is important to define both separately. This
allows us to evaluate how well different policies achieve the same goal.
There are two different definitions of poverty: "absolute" and "relative." Poverty, according to the absolute definition, is the lack of resources necessary to meet one's basic needs. According to the relative definition, poverty is the possession of a level of resources that is less than some specific proportion of the level of resources possessed by the average person. According to the absolute definition, "the poverty line" is the amount of income needed for a person or family to purchase their minimum needs for food, shelter, and clothing.[1] A family with less income than the poverty line is considered to be living in poverty. This is the definition we use. We do so because we think the relative conception is really about another important social issue: this is the issue of inequality. Instead of addressing this issue here, we leave it for a future work. Our first priority should be to meet everyone’s basic needs before addressing the question of whether there is enough equality in the consumption of luxuries.
The question of how the poverty line ought to be has been
extensively debated (Schiller 1989; Schwarz and Volgy
1992; and Mishel and Bernstein 1994), but this is not
a debate we intend to join here. For present purposes, we accept the
government's standard of the poverty line. There are good reasons to believe it
is inadequate, but arguments that BIG is the best
policy to reach that line would not differ significantly if the line were drawn
higher.
We
believe that there is a broad consensus among all but the most radical property
rights advocates that the ultimate goal of policy should be to reduce poverty
as much as possible and eliminate it if we can. People who argue for less generous redistribution
most often couch their arguments in terms of such programs being
counter-productive or ineffective, and to goal of this paper is not to question
the sincerely of that argument, but it’s validity. Bob Dole
exemplified this consensus in the 1996 presidential debates when
he said, "this is America, nobody's going to starve."
That statement is non-controversial even in partisan debates; thus, we feel free to evaluate policies by how effectively and
efficiently they reduce poverty. The wide differences of opinion about
poverty policy reflect differences about how best to achieve
that goal, which in turn depends on people’s
beliefs about the causes of poverty.
VIEWS
ON THE CAUSES OF POVERTY
There are many differing views on the cause or causes of
poverty, including the physical inability to work, inadequate demand for labor,
inadequate human capital, lack of work ethic, and single parenthood. There is
no clear consensus about the relative importance of each of these possible
causes. We discuss each of them and then discuss our own view.
A. Physical Inability to Work
Some people are physically incapable of holding a job and,
hence, providing for their own subsistence because of old age or disability.
Disabilities can be the result of a birth defect or an injury. They can be
either physical or mental, including developmental delays or mental illness.
Although this is in some ways the most straightforward and widely accepted
cause of poverty, there is considerable gray area as to how disabled one must
be to be incapable of working (Dolgoff, Feldstein,
and Skolnik 1993). The House Committee on Ways and
Means (1992) defines the disabled as, “those unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of medically determined physical or
mental impairment expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months.” A major
question raised by this definition is what types of physical and mental
impairments render one unable to, “engage in any substantial gainful activity?”
That is a difficult qualitative question. Some people with disabilities severe
enough to make them eligible for assistance do work while others with the same
categorical disability do not. Do they differ in unobserved abilities or in
their willingness to work for the wages available?
B. Single-Parenthood
A single parent, especially of an infant, is faced with
the problem of having full-time demands on them outside of work. One cause of
poverty could be that single parents cannot afford the time away from their
children to work[2]
(Ellwood 1988). Diane Pearce (1978) found that female-headed families have
become a disproportionate share of the impoverished population. William Kelso
(1994) found that, between 1960 and 1991, the percentage of poor families
headed by single women increased from 18.3% to 38.7%. There is disagreement
whether this should be viewed as a root cause of poverty or not (Mishel and Bernstein 1994; Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986; and Mayer 1997). If single parenthood does
cause poverty, the root cause is whatever makes people become single parents.
Are they people in unfortunate circumstances or people
who have deliberately chosen their position? Some authors (Magnet 1993; Murray
1984; and Tanner 1996) argue that welfare causes single parenthood by
encouraging women who would not otherwise become single parents to do so.
According to Marlene Kim (1997) while most single-parents with children under
age six did not work, 46% of those who did work had incomes below the poverty
line, which implies that the reason that so many single-parents do not work is
because if they do they may have a high probability of still being in poverty.
C. Inadequate Demand for Labor
According to this view, the demand for labor is presently
not high enough to employ, at above poverty wages, all those who are willing
and able to supply their labor. Two consequences can follow from this: high
unemployment or low wage employment. Keep in mind that, according to this view,
low wage employment is caused not by lack of human capital but by inadequate
demand. Just as is the case in any other market, when demand is less than
supply, there is downward pressure on price, which in this case is the wage
(Harvey 1989; Harrison and Bluestone 1990; Rose 1994; and Wilson 1996).
To be unemployed one has to be willing, able, and looking
to work at the going wage, but unable to find it. A person can only be
unemployed in this sense if there is inadequate demand for her labor at the
going wage. Some Neoclassical economists reject the idea that unemployment can
exist for very long. According to this view, what appears to be unemployment is
really a result of people choosing not to sell their labor at the going wage,
perhaps because they are searching for a better job, making their unemployment
“frictional.” When demand for labor is low, wages
simply fall until an equilibrium level is reached at which all workers who are
willing to work can find a job. In other words, if more workers want to work
than there are jobs, the wage will simply fall until no one wants those jobs
anymore (Munday 1996).
Even if an equilibrium level can be shown to exist there
is no reason to believe that the equilibrium wage will be a living wage. There
is no economic theory assuring that everyone who wants to work can find a job
that pays above poverty wages. It has been pointed out at least as long ago as
Adam Smith (1776/1976), and by many others since, that workers have a
disadvantageous position in the labor market because they need a job to survive
but the owners of natural resources do not need employees to survive. This
could explain the tendency for wages to be low in at least some sectors of the
economy. This “lack of market power” cause of poverty tends to be overlooked,
and we caution that any poverty policy should be evaluated by its effect on the
market power of laborers. The lack-of-market-power argument can be expressed in
an imperfect model of the labor market or using the perfect-competition model.
In the latter case the distress of works causes a large amount of competition
for a limited number of employment opportunities bidding down wages.
D. Low Level of Human Capital
Human capital refers to the skills, knowledge, and
abilities that make people more productive on the job. If the labor market is
competitive, economic theory predicts that the people with more human capital
will find more work and better paying jobs. This theory is the basis of one
influential view of the cause of poverty: people with poor skills end up either
unemployed or employed in low wage jobs (Atkinson 1983; Becker 1993; and
Ehrenberg and Smith 1994).
E. Lack of Work Ethic
Some people may choose to behave in ways that cause their
own poverty. For example, Lawrence Mead (1986) contends that an insufficient
work ethic causes poverty. Able-bodied persons might choose not to work because
they would rather stay home, or they may choose not to work hard and find it
hard to hold a job. Individuals who chose not to work are considered “out of
the labor force,” because they voluntarily chose not to participate at the
going wage.
F. Our View of the Causes of Poverty
As we see it, all of the factors mentioned in the
previous sections should be considered. The causes of poverty are many and
complex, but the problem is simple; people are poor if they do not have enough
money to buy the basic necessities of life. Although some of the possible
causes of poverty are clearly more important than others, because the problem
has many possible causes we would be ill advised to ignore any of them. We
believe that the widespread characterization of the poor as bad people with no
work ethic is clearly false, but we would believe it is a mistake to go so far
as to assume that no one has an insufficient desire to work or that certain
kinds of policies might discourage that desire.
We believe that a significant problem of formulating
effective public policy is caused by the fact that many people on all sides of
the political spectrum find it appealing to focus on only one or a few causes.
The left tends to focus on unemployment while the right tends to believe that
people do not value work enough. What tends to be left out of the discussion is
that the extent to which people value work depends upon wages and working
conditions. People may not value work, not because they lack the work ethic,
not because the alternatives are too appealing, but because the jobs available
are not rewarding. Policies designed to foster a work-ethic sufficient to make
workers accept a lifetime of working for poverty wages cannot end poverty but
they can do much to help people who pay poverty wages.
Policies should be evaluated on the basis of their
effects on the living standards of the working poor, the living standards of
those who do not work and the size of each group. In 2002, there were 7.4
million people who had been in the labor force for at least 27 weeks who were
poor. This amounted to 5.3% of the labor force (U.S. Department of Labor/Bureau
of Statistics, 2004). The problem we address in the next section is to design a
policy that takes all of the causes of poverty into account. Even though the
problem is complex, the solution must be simple enough to be politically
manageable. We should focus on “treating” the problem but look carefully on how
well any treatment of it addresses the possible causes.
SOCIAL
POLICIES TO ADDRESS POVERTY
In this section, we discuss six possible solutions to
poverty. Four are aspects of the current system and two are proposed reforms.
We do so by relating these solutions to the different possible causes of
poverty, evaluating how well they combat these causes and achieve the goal of
cost effectively reducing or eliminating poverty.
A. Policy Aimed at Economic Growth and Full Employment
One often cited approach is to aim government policy at
increasing economic growth, indirectly increasing the demand for labor, increasing
wages and reducing poverty. However, historically, growth has sometimes reduced
but never eliminated poverty. In 1949, despite years of sustained growth and
the highest per capita income in the world, almost one third (32%) of Americans
lived in poverty (Levy 1987). The greatest reduction in poverty in US history
happened in the period 1949 to 1973, falling from 32% in 1949 to 11.1% in 1973
largely as a result of active government policy (Levy 1987). Since 1973 there
has been a disturbing trend in which poverty increased, despite sustained
economic growth, creeping back up to 14.5% by 1994 (Gottschalk, 1997).
The economy did not grow as quickly between 1973 and 1994
as it did between 1949 and 1973, but it was wealthier for entire later period
than it was during the earlier period. Clearly, economic growth on its own does
not eliminate poverty. Just because there is wealth to go around does not mean
that some of that wealth will get around to the poor.
Why growth does not eliminate poverty is a difficult and
controversial question that closely relates to the debate about the cause(s) of
poverty. Growth cannot cure the disabled. It could provide more opportunities
for the unemployed, but not necessarily. William Baumol
and Edward Wolff (1996) find that economic growth actually increases the average level of unemployment. Constantly changing
technology, which stimulates growth, also tends to displace labor, creating
demand for new skills, making other skills obsolete.
Rebecca Blank (1994) found that the poverty rate declined by little during the
relatively long economic expansion that occurred between 1982 and late 1990.
Therefore, we believe that economic growth, though strongly desirable, is not a
solution to poverty.
A similar belief is that the government can use fiscal
and monetary policy to maintain the full employment level of output. We believe
that, like economic growth, full employment is desirable but full employment
alone is not enough to eliminate poverty. The U.S. government’s experiments at
maintaining full employment have been mixed and some economists believe that
the closest attainable approximation of it is a 5 percent unemployment rate (Munday 1996). Others contend that it is possible to bring
the unemployment rate down as low as 3 or 4 percent as it has been at times in
post-war U.S. history. However, in 1966, during the Vietnam War, the
unemployment rate was only 3.8 percent but the poverty rate was 14.7 percent
(Census Bureau, 1975). In 1953, during the Korean War, the unemployment rate
was only 2.9 percent, the lowest rate between the end of World War II and the
present, yet the poverty rate was 26.2 percent (Murray 1984). Clearly full
employment alone will not eliminate poverty.
B. Workfare
Workfare is a policy approach, now being implemented as
part of the recent welfare reform legislation. It is a component of The
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF), formerly AFDC.
TANF recipients with very young children are required to
work or prepare for work in return for their benefits. Work activities include
working in parks, social service agencies and schools. Preparation for work
includes enrollment in secondary school, classroom-based job training programs,
and other activities, designed to prepare people to make the transition from
welfare to the job market. TANF recipients who do not take part in these
activities stand the risk of losing a portion of their benefits. They are paid
less than minimum wage, and far below the poverty line (Center on Social
Welfare Policy and Law 1996a). The Welfare reform law also includes a five year
lifetime limit on welfare benefits as an added incentive for recipients to move
from welfare to work (Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law 1996b).
Obviously, workfare does nothing for people who are
physically unable to work. It is usually viewed as part of a more comprehensive
strategy along with other policies aimed at those who physically cannot work.
Single parents are the main participants in workfare. Its
goal is to get single parents into the workforce, assuming that the reason they
do not work is because they lack a work ethic or adequate human capital. This
is a departure from the strategy of AFDC, which before 1988 did not require
single parents of children under six to work outside the home (Lewis 1995).
Workfare requires that single parents put their children in someone else’s care
while they work. This increases the cost of the program. Part of the strategy
of workfare seems to be to discourage people from deciding to become single
parents, but it does not offer anything very attractive to people who are
single parents nor does it deal very well with the lack of available time of
single parents as a cause of poverty.
From the perspective of the low level of labor demand
theory of poverty, the workfare approach is unappealing. In fact, it is likely
to hurt the working poor, increasing the poverty of those regarded as the most
deserving. Neoclassical economic theory predicts that, all else equal, if
workfare succeeds in moving more people into the labor market, it will increase
the supply of labor, leaving demand unchanged, and drive down wages for all of
those in the low-wage labor market. According to Keynesian theory, new entrants
will not necessarily be able to find work. Neither outcome is very attractive.
Because low-wage workers are already paid poverty wages, even if former TANF
recipients can find jobs at prevailing wages, they will still have incomes
below the poverty line. Public debate has focused on the extent to which
workfare has succeeded in moving recipients from welfare to work, with very
little discussion of its impact on poverty. If TANF succeeds in reducing
welfare rolls by increasing the poverty of the working poor it could hardly be
called a success for the poor—for their employers perhaps, but not for the
poor.
From the low level of human capital perspective, the
workfare approach could conceivably be viewed approvingly, but it would take a
major revision of the approach for this to happen. Workfare is ostensibly
designed to enhance the skills, work experience, and education of welfare
recipients. However, many of the jobs workfare participants are being offered,
such as picking up garbage in parks, do not provide
people with opportunities to enhance their human capital at all. Workfare would
need to be completely overhauled for the work done by participants to be truly
human capital enhancing. This, however, would greatly increase the expense of
the program.
Supporters of the view that poverty is caused by the lack
of a work ethic, often advocate workfare because of its potential to socialize
the undeserving poor into recognizing the importance of work. The fact that
TANF recipients are denied assistance if they fail to show up for workfare
assignments provides a powerful incentive for them to behave more “responsibly”
and go out and get a job. Assuming the legitimacy of governmental efforts to
socialize the “irresponsible” into recognizing the importance of work, the
workfare approach is problematic. Workfare participants are expected to work,
but are not considered “workers;” they are still treated as “recipients.” It
has not yet been established whether they have the right to organize, even
though some claim that in many cases, their duties were formerly performed by
union workers. Workfare offers its “recipients” work at poverty wages
potentially for years. It is hard to see how this will teach people the value
of hard work. It may only teach them that if you’re willing to work hard,
others will take advantage of you.
The major problem with workfare is that it appears
grounded on an extreme version of the work ethic: a one sided moral obligation
that requires the poor to work for their subsistence, but employers (whether
private or government) are not obliged to pay subsistence wages. It also does
not create any incentive for employers to pay living wages. In fact, it may be
the case that much of our recent welfare reform has primarily benefited low
wage employers rather than workers (Lewis 1995; Piven and Cloward
1993). There are at least two less extreme alternatives. One would be to hold
employers to a reciprocal moral obligation to pay living wages; the other is to
offer people positive incentives to work rather than an obligation.
The latest round of welfare reform, that highlights
workfare, greatly over-emphasizes the “bad values” explanation of poverty; it
ignores even the possibility that the
poor might already have a good work ethic. Many, perhaps all, would be willing
to work if they had enough incentive to do so, but wages are so low that there
is little incentive to do so. Our current strategy treats this by making
absence from work less attractive rather than by making work more attractive.
In other words, we make people more willing to work for below poverty wages.
This probably will succeed in increasing work, but it will not succeed in
helping the poor or ending poverty.
The available evidence suggests that welfare recipients
who have been participants in workfare programs are not much more likely to
leave welfare for work than those recipients who have not participated in such
programs. Those former workfare participants who do obtain employment usually
end up with wages well below the official poverty line (Gueron
and Pauly 1991 and Friedlander and Burtless 1995).
Supporters of the work ethic argument would probably
counter that simply getting people into the workforce will put them on the road
to success, while welfare is a dead end. We have three responses to this
argument. First, hard work is no guarantee of long run success in the labor
market. From the work ethic perspective, one could say that it is an
individual’s responsibility to improve her skills. However, someone in a
desperate situation working two minimum wage jobs to keep her family above the
poverty line, would not have much time to enhance her skills. Low wage poverty
could in this case be self-perpetuating.
Second, low wage employment has detrimental social consequences.
Elliot Currie (1985) found that underemployment is, in fact, more closely
associated with crime than unemployment.
Third, if workfare does provide benefits, they are long
delayed. Currently, in no state do welfare benefits raise income to the poverty
line (Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law 1996a). This could last up to
five years and still the recipient may not be able to find a job that pays
above the poverty line when leaving the program. Therefore, workfare risks
making participants work through years of poverty only to end up still poor. It
holds recipients to a moral obligation to work for subsistence, but does not
hold anyone to the obligation to pay subsistence wages.
C. The Minimum Wage
The minimum wage is another strategy to reduce poverty.
It is currently $5.15 per hour, approximately $10,000 per year before taxes.
However, it would have to be increased much further – to about $9.20 per hour –
to bring pretax wages to the poverty line, of $18,400 per year (U.S. Federal
Register 2003).
Clearly, an increased minimum wage is not aimed at those
who are physically unable to work. Assisting this group would require a
separate program.
It could raise the wages of single parents, although it
would not do much to render working easier for single parents. It could make it
more affordable for single parents to find childcare and, thereby, increase
their willingness to work. However, providing singe parents enough resources to
allow them to afford daycare and remain above the poverty line would require a
further increase in the minimum wage or a government funded daycare program.
If the cause of poverty is inadequate demand for labor,
the minimum wage approach is an unappealing solution by itself. It does nothing
for the unemployed. On the surface, the minimum wage looks like an appealing
solution if inadequate demand for labor causes wages to drop below the poverty
line. However, even though it increases wages for those who can find jobs, it
does not directly expand demand for labor, and, some argue, it might reduce the
amount of labor demanded causing an increase in unemployment.
A proponent of the low level of human capital view is not
likely to find much to approve of regarding the minimum wage approach, because
it does not directly enhance human capital. It would treat the symptom but not
the cause of the problem (Brown 1988).
A higher minimum wage would have limited appeal for
someone who believes poverty is primarily caused by a lack of work ethic on the
part of the poor. Lawrence Mead (1992) argues that the poor, even the working
poor, can bring themselves out of poverty, if they take advantage of
opportunities that already exist to improve their skills. A minimum wage does
increase the incentive to go to work, but it does not necessarily do so enough
to bring everyone with “bad values” out to work.
Our view of the minimum wage is mixed. It is certainly
the case that the government could increase the minimum wage enough to bring
those working for it above the poverty line. This would be consistent with the
idea of a reciprocal moral obligation for employers. However, there is
conflicting evidence whether the minimum wage causes increased unemployment.
Brown (1988) found that it does, especially among "minorities" and the
unskilled, implying that a higher minimum wage would move some out of poverty
and others into it. Card and Krueger’s (1995) results suggest that we should
question the link between the minimum wage and unemployment. Castillo-Freeman
and Freeman (1991) find evidence that small changes in the minimum wage do not
cause significant increases in unemployment but large changes do. To increase
the minimum wage to $9.20 per hour would be a 79 percent increase. There is no
certainty whether this would increase unemployment, but it does not help the
unemployed. To eliminate poverty the minimum wage would have to be combined
with other policies to help the unemployed and those who are unable to work.
The basic income guarantee, which gives low-wage workers market power to command
a living wage, and which helps the working poor and the unemployed alike, is a
simpler and more comprehensive strategy to achieve the goal of higher wages and
higher after-tax incomes.
D. Separating the “Deserving” and “Undeserving” poor
The current social insurance system is based largely on
the belief that there are not one but many causes of poverty, allowing us to
categorize the poor, not by how poor they are, but by how “deserving” they are.
People who advocate this policy typically believe that those who cannot work
(either because of disability or unemployment) are the “deserving” poor while
those who simply do not work, are the “undeserving” poor (Zastro,
1986). The strategy then becomes to categorize the poor by the cause of their
poverty, create a different solution for each deserving category, and encourage
the undeserving poor to get a job. If it works perfectly all of those who
cannot work will be helped, while all those who can work will have no work
disincentives. As we discuss below, this definition leaves out some one who
does not work because of unacceptable working conditions.
This strategy offers a complex solution to a complex
problem, employing each of the strategies discussed in parts A, B, and C as
part of an enormous system of incomplete and overlapping programs as summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1:
|
Category (cause) |
Program |
|
Physically unable to work |
Social Security, SSI, Medicare, Worker’s
Compensation, Medicaid |
|
Single parents |
TANF, public housing, Medicaid, Food Stamps |
|
Unemployment |
Unemployment Insurance, food stamps, public housing, Medicaid |
|
Low wages |
The minimum wage, food stamps, public housing, Medicaid, the earned
income tax credit |
|
Inadequate Human capital |
Public education, some counseling as a part of TANF and other programs |
|
Lack of work ethic |
Employment Counseling, denial of benefits |
Despite the large number
of programs, they are not enough to eliminate poverty or even to bring all
workers out of poverty; remember that 5.3% of the labor force in 2002 had
incomes below the poverty line (U.S. Department of Labor/Bureau of Statistics,
2004). Each program has its own eligibility requirements, making it difficult
for people in need to know what they might qualify for. Simply having low or no
income does not qualify someone for these programs; thus, many poor people may
fail to qualify for any assistance at all.
The categorical approach has been the basis for our
social welfare system since the great depression. Although it has had many
successes and has helped to reduce poverty, especially among the elderly, we
believe it is clear that this approach has proven to be extremely expensive and
not completely effective. The rest of this section discusses four reasons why
the categorical approach is not efficient or effective: first, the problem with
defining “deserving,” second, the cost of categorizing each person, third, the
harsh penalty for the undeserving, fourth, the effect
of this position on the market power of workers.
First, how can one accurately define “deserving?” Even if
we accept the distinction between those that cannot and do not work, how can we
agree on who is able to work? Most would agree that a person with a severe
developmental disability or someone with a profound case of schizophrenia is
unable to work, but it is harder to agree about milder disabilities? A blind
psychiatrist can still work but not a blind factory worker. Does being blind
make a person deserving? What if the blindness was caused by complications due
to diabetes that resulted from eating too many sweets? Once single mothers were
considered “deserving” now they are not.
Second, once a definition of need is determined, it is
costly to separate people into categories of need. The effort involved in
categorization is expensive and there are significant costs associated with
making mistakes. Our social welfare system has numerous overlapping programs
all with the same ultimate goal. Each program has its own eligibility
requirements making it expensive for the government to determine who is
qualified for which program, and it is difficult for needy persons to determine
which programs they may be eligible for. Programs vary greatly in the portion
of total spending taken up by administrative costs, some being surprisingly
high. The administrative cost of unemployment insurance is more than 85 percent
of its total budget while the administrative costs of social security is less
than 1 percent of its total budget (House Ways and Means Committee, 1992).
Third, the cost of making mistakes is just as important.
Someone who is actually deserving could be classified as not deserving (a type
2 error), or someone who is not deserving could be classified as deserving (a
type 1 error). A type 2 error is someone “falling through the cracks” such as a
homeless person with an undiagnosed mental disorder. Type 1 errors include
giving benefits to someone who has a high income, such as sending a social
security check to a retired billionaire. Type 1 errors also include giving
benefits to someone who has a low income but would otherwise be earning a
higher private income, such as a person who waits until unemployment runs out
before looking for a job.
Separating the deserving from the undeserving involves a
very high penalty for laziness. Even if a person is “truly undeserving” should
they face imminent starvation? This makes the penalty for laziness more severe
than the penalty for most crimes except murder. It seems also to retreat from the
goal of eliminating poverty. Saving (1997) characterizes this as “tough love”
saying that less redistribution will get more of the poor into the labor force,
reducing the number of the poor at the cost of increasing the severity of
poverty. Even if this were an acceptable trade off, we doubt that it would work
once we seriously consider its effects on the labor market.
This brings us to the fourth problem with the categorical
strategy. It hurts the market position of all laborers. Requiring everyone to
work increases the supply (or reduces the market power) of labor making workers
desperate to get a job quickly. We have inadequately attempted to solve these
problems by other government actions such as the minimum wage and labor
regulations, but none solve the underlying problem that workers are desperate
for jobs, but employers are not desperate for workers. The distinction between
deserving and undeserving does not allow a person the freedom to refuse a job
because the pay is too low or the working conditions unacceptable. Our effort
to impose “tough love” undermines our belief that people who work hard should
be rewarded for it. The definition that those who work are “deserving,” implies
that no one who works full time full year should live in poverty, yet many of
our workers do – not because they are lazy, but because of their bargaining
position.
This problem can lead to a paradox of hard work. The
harder workers work, the more labor there is in the market, and the further
wages will go down.
The current system over-emphasizes “bad values” as the
cause of poverty. Workers may have good values but few opportunities, and “bad
values” may be the result, not the cause of poverty. People at the low end of
the job market know that the jobs available to them pay very little and offer
little hope of advancement. A minimum wage job requires a single parent with
two children to work two jobs just to get by; which could take 70 to 80 hours
of work a week just to reach the poverty line, and she can’t get there unless
she has access to a large amount of free childcare. This person would not be
able to save money to start his own business and would not have time outside of
work to learn skills to improve her situation. It would take years to advance
out of this situation. It is not surprising that people faced with these
options do not develop a strong work ethic. If we want people to value work, we
must make work valuable to them in the short run, not as a distant promise
coming after years of poverty wages.
We believe that one should not be called “undeserving”
for choosing not to work if the only jobs open to them would leave their
families in poverty. We, therefore, search for a solution that will give
workers greater market power. The guaranteed income would increase the market
power of workers and so it would help the unemployed and working poor alike.
E. Guaranteed Public Employment
Because inadequate demand for labor is a significant cause
of poverty and unemployment, government provided jobs have been proposed as a
solution. A comprehensive version could replace all transfer payments to those
able to work (including TANF, unemployment insurance, the minimum wage, food
stamps, and public housing) with a government guarantee to hire anyone willing
and able to work. This idea is known as the public jobs approach, the
guaranteed job, or the government as employer of last resort (ELR). Hyman Minsky proposed a version in 1986; another version, the WPA, was introduced in the United States during the Great
Depression.
Several Post Keynesian economists have recently put
forward ELR proposals as a systematic method to balance the demand and supply
of labor without creating inflationary pressure. The best known of these is the
book Understanding Modern Money (Wray
1998), and the comments here are directed at that proposal. An evaluation ELR
as an economic stabilization tool is beyond the scope of this paper. We will be
evaluating it as a tool to reduce poverty. It is possible that ELR could
simultaneously be an efficient tool to stabilize the economy and an inefficient
tool to reduce poverty. To the extent that ELR can stabilize the economy in
ways that other policies do not, those effects could at least partially
mitigate the inefficiency effects that we point out below.
There are two important differences between ELR and
workfare. First, ELR is comprehensive: the government promises to hire anyone
who is willing and able to work at a pre-determined wage. They do not need to
demonstrate that they are poor or single parents as workfare requires. Second,
ELR is pays higher wages. Wray argues that ELR should pay a living wage and
include fringe benefits such as healthcare, childcare, and retirement. He uses
$6.25 per hour for illustration and asks the reader to “assume” that that is a
living wage while admitting that that assumption is unlikely to be true unless
wages are supplemented with other sources of income, possibly including a
second job (Wray 1998, p. 125 and p. 150).
Obviously public employment is not aimed at those unable
to work; it would have to be combined with programs for the elderly and
disabled as part of a more comprehensive strategy to eliminate poverty. As a
poverty policy, it must, therefore, be seen as part of a larger targeted system
of benefits, and the associated costs of determining who is eligible for a
public job and who is eligible for other kinds of aid count as inefficiencies
of a poverty strategy incorporating ELR.
It would seem to eliminate the problem of separating the
unemployed from the unwilling to work, but it would not do that perfectly. The
ELR offers a uniform wage equal to the minimum wage. Some people might be
genuinely unemployed from higher-skilled occupations and unwilling to accept
underemployment in ELR jobs.
ELR could help single parents in poverty, but not without
serious side effects. The jobs could pay enough to enable workers to obtain
private day care, or they could include day care as a fringe benefit, or they
could arrange flexible hours and work-sharing arrangements so that groups of
workers could take turns caring for each other’s children. All of these create
the problem of separating parents from children for a significant amount of
time, which might not be the best thing for those families. The alternative
would be to classify single parents as those “unable to work.” But because
single parents and their children make up the majority of the poor, doing so
would mean that a job guarantee could not help most people who live in poverty.
The ELR could eliminate both of the problems (low wages
and unemployment) caused by a low demand for labor. It would directly eliminate
unemployment, and, if it pays higher than poverty wages, it would nearly eliminate
low wages as a source of poverty. An ELR with health benefits, daycare, and a
living wage would greatly reduce poverty, but a low-wage would not reduce the
number of people living in poverty and would verge on being exploitative.
Although at one point Wray argues that ELR should pay a
living wage, he is not very optimistic that an ELR can or should attempt to
increase the going wage in the labor market. He seems to take the going wage in
terms of purchasing power in the low-wage sector as something beyond the
control of policy. With a very small discussion of how and why the purchasing
power of wages is determined or whether it can be influenced by other policies,
he states that increasing the ELR wage is equivalent to devaluing the currency
and that other wages and prices will adjust upward to reflect devaluation (p.
135-136). That implies that if the going wage in the labor market is a poverty
wage, ELR alone is powerless to give low-wage workers a higher standard of
living. If ELR jobs at the going wage are poverty-wage jobs, why is it so
important to make sure everybody has one rather than making sure that everybody
has the power to refuse them? I do not believe that proponents of guaranteed
public employment believe that stabilizing the price level has the necessary
side effect of leaving the working class with no other option but to work for
poverty wages, but they need to spell out their strategy not only how to get
the poor to work but to ensure that once they do they will no longer be poor.
That said, the rest of this
section assumes that the ELR system has found a way to pay wages sufficient to
bring workers out of poverty.
Proponents of the low level of human capital view might
give qualified approve of the public jobs approach if the ELR has the power to
set higher wages. That policy could directly eliminate the symptom (low wages),
but would less directly address its cause. Public employees might or might not
gain valuable work experience and skills necessary for them to increase their
earnings if and when they return to the private sector. An extreme proponent of
the low human capital view might fear that public jobs would become “make
work,” and would not eventually lead to better private sector jobs. However, if
such a problem arises, the system could be readjusted to include a job-training
program.
People who think that the poor lack sufficient values
might also voice qualified approval of this approach. They would see its major
weakness being the difficulty to both guarantee a job and give people an
incentive to work hard on that job. Could workers be fired for poor
performance? If not, it wouldn’t be much of a job. But if so, the job would not
be a truly guaranteed job, and what would happen to the people who were fired?
If a worker does not perform his job adequately, the problem of separating
those who cannot perform due to mental disability from those who simply do not
perform resurfaces. An employer of last resort may be reluctant to fire
employees, but workers who least value hard work would have incentives to try
to work as little as possible. One solution would be to take on judgmental
position and treat such workers as “undeserving,” “bad” people who ought to be
poor or homeless. Another solution would be to heavily supervise employees, but
this could increase cost, reduce productivity, and develop an antagonism
between employees and management. A third solution would be to combine ELR with
a smaller, universal system, such as the basic income guarantee, so that people
who did not accept the jobs as they are or did not perform well enough to keep
them, would not do as well as ELR workers but were not destitute either.
However, like workfare, public employment might socialize
the poor into recognizing the value of work. It would do this more effectively
than workfare if it positively rewarded work with a higher than poverty income.
Thus, participants would directly and immediately see a positive reward for
their labor.
Our view is that public employment would be a vast
improvement over the current state of affairs, or any of the strategies
discussed above. Like the guaranteed income it would act as an automatic
stabilizer on the economy and would eliminate many of the sources of poverty.
However, there are four reasons why public employment is not as appealing as
the guaranteed income.
First, it relies on an extreme version of the work ethic
similar to workfare. We say this because, like workfare, unless it is
accompanied by some universal support system, an ELR would require able-bodied
persons to work in return for assistance. We hasten to add, however, that
public employment with a living wage would apply the extreme version of the
work ethic more fairly than the current system does. This is because it would
create a reciprocal moral obligation rather than a one sided moral obligation.
It would require people to work for assistance but would assure that the level
of assistance was high enough to allow them to escape poverty. Yet, it would
put workers in the position in which they have to accept the employer’s
decision about what is a fair wage. Public employment in the context of a
society in which poor individuals have no access to the means of survival
unless they work for people who control property leaves the workers with no options
but to accept whatever the employers decide is fair. We would like to hope that
the market wage is always fair or that public employers will always decide to
pay good wages, but we don’t have reason to believe those hopes will always
come true. Isn’t it rather one-sided to believe that the class of people who
control access to jobs and government assistance can judge the poor as
“deserving” or “undeserving” while the class of people
who work are not given the power to judge employers as being “deserving” of
having employees?
Second, a major disadvantage of public employment is that
this would be significantly more expensive than the guaranteed income. In
addition to the wage costs, and the costs of separating those who can work and
those who should be eligible for other programs, and the administrative costs
of those other programs, the ELR would have enormous the overhead costs of its
own including supervisors, materials, transportation, and planning. Every town
and neighborhood would have to have facilities and managers available to handle
peak levels of unemployment sitting idle during periods of relatively low
unemployment. If the ELR was replaced by a basic income guarantee, all of these
costs could be turned into higher payments to the poor or greater government
services without putting any additional pressure on prices.
Guaranteed public employment also has external costs
that, though hard to measure in pecuniary terms, are costs just the same. A
public employment induced net increase in the supply of labor would also mean
an increase in traffic congestion, crowed subways/buses, and the health effects
(stress, respiratory problems associated with breathing in automobile fumes,
etc.), and increased environmental depletion of any scarce assets used in
production. Traffic congestion and some types of work also tend to create noise
pollution which, even if not a threat to health (which it can be), is certainly
what neoclassical economists would call a disutility.
Considering all of these costs a public jobs program
could turn out to cost many times more than its wage cost. Thus, it is likely
to be the most expensive of all programs we discuss in this paper. The
guaranteed income, because of its simplicity, would be likely to have low
administrative costs comparable to social security as discussed above.
One could counter that the cost of public employment
would be compensated for by the fact that participants would be producing goods
that would counteract these costs. However, participants would also be giving
up time that they could spend in job training, starting a business,
volunteering, getting an education, raising children, or doing whatever it is
they find valuable. There is no objective way to judge whether participants
would make more valuable use of their time with a guaranteed job or a
guaranteed income and thus no a priori way to say that the increased production
of the public employment approach would be worth its cost.[3]
Third, both public employment and the guaranteed income
would create an effective bed for private sector wages, but the guaranteed
income could have a greater effect on private sector wages for a given level of
benefits. For instance, to establish $300 a week as the effective minimum wage,
public wages would have be $300 to make workers indifferent between private and
public sector jobs. However, if people preferred leisure to labor, the
guaranteed income could be less than $300 to make workers indifferent between
private sector jobs and living off the guaranteed income.
Fourth, public employment would be a logistical
nightmare. Imagine all the resources the government would have to expend
deciding what public employees would do and all of the political fights over
what district would get which jobs and the output. Unemployment is erratic and,
presumably, so would be the number of applicants for public jobs. How would
public employment ensure enough work for all applicants, in all locations, at
all times without resorting to make work?
F. The
Basic Income Guarantee
In this section, we argue that the
basic income guarantee (BIG) is the most efficient and comprehensive poverty
policy, because it can eliminate poverty no matter what the cause. There are
different versions of the basic income guarantee, including the citizen's
income, the basic income, the negative income tax, the social dividend, and
others. For our purposes we need not go into detail about the technical
differences between them. All of them are essentially income insurance,
providing a guarantee that no one’s income falls below the poverty line for any
reason, but ensuring that the more one works outside the home, the better off
one is.
There are two important numbers in a
basic income guarantee scheme: The grant level and the marginal tax rate. The
grant (or the minimum income or the maximum supplement) is the amount of money
received by a person who makes no private income. The marginal tax rate is the
rate at which the grant is reduced (in the case of a negative income tax) or
private income is taxed (in the case of a basic income) as private income
rises. The basic income guarantee would replace most of tax and benefit system
with a simple equation. After tax income (D) equals private income (Y) times one minus the marginal tax rate (t) plus the grant
(G):
D = Y(1-t)
+ G
If the grant is greater than private
income times the tax rate, net taxes (T) are negative (the person or family is
a net recipient of transfers):
T = Yt - G
For example, suppose
we constructed a system with a $10,000 grant for a family of three and a 50
percent marginal tax rate (meaning that for every dollar a family earns they
would lose $0.50 of their supplement or they would pay $0.50 tax on their
private income). A family with no private income would receive the $10,000 transfer.
If that family earned $2,000 privately, its benefits would be reduced by $1000
(50% of $2,000) amounting to an after tax income of $11,000
($10,000-$1,000+$2,000=$11,000). If this family increased their private
earnings to $10,000, their after tax income would be $15,000. If this family
increased its earnings to 20,000 (the break-even point), it would receive no
net subsidy giving it an after tax income of $20,000. Notice that this family
is always economically better off increasing its private earnings rather than
relying solely on the basic income guarantee.
Private Income Net Tax After-Tax
Income Average Tax Rate
0 -10,000 10,000 -
5,000 -7,500 12,500 -150%
10,000 -5,000 15,000 -50%
20,000 0 20,000 0
30,000 +5,000 25,000 17%
50,000 +15,000 35,000 30%
100,000 +40,000 60,000 40%
These numbers are purely for
illustration. The minimum income level and the marginal tax rate would have to be
chosen based on the poverty line and the revenue available. Notice that
although the marginal tax rate is fairly high at 50% the average tax rate is
much lower for most families. Notice also that although the marginal tax rate
is proportional the overall effect of the tax benefit system is quite
progressive. The marginal tax rate could be reduced by collecting revenue from
property, sales, or wealth taxes while collecting less revenue from the income
tax.
Those who believe poverty stems from
disability or single parent status might find the BIG approach appealing. A
basic income guarantee would assure that everyone unable to work, for any
reason, would not become impoverished. Retirees could live off of the minimum
income, but would be assured that the more private savings they have
accumulated, the better off they would be. Some,
however, advocate combining BIG with a retirement program or simply giving a
higher maximum supplement to retirees. The basic income guarantee would
eliminate the possibility that someone would fall through the cracks because
someone truly unable to work, but who does not qualify for a particular program
under the current system, would be guaranteed assistance under the system we
propose.
The guaranteed income would work
very well to prevent poverty if inadequate demand for labor is the cause of
poverty, whether it causes low wages or high unemployment. The unemployed would
be able to live off of the minimum income until they found another job, while
low-wage workers would receive a supplement bringing their income above the
poverty line, always making them better off than those who are not working.
The guaranteed income would
eliminate many of the negative effects of our current policies for inadequate
demand for labor. Unlike the possibility with a minimum wage, it would not
directly have a negative effect on labor demand. And unlike unemployment
insurance, it would not encourage workers to stay on until their benefits run
out nor leave them desperate to find any job after their benefits run out. A
worker on unemployment has to give up her entire supplement to take a job, and
risks not being able to get her benefits back if she has to quit her job.
Suppose a recipient received $200 a week in unemployment insurance. If they
were offered a $250 a week job, they would lose all of their unemployment
benefits, and start paying income taxes leaving them little better off and
possibly worse off than staying on unemployment. A person in the same situation
with a basic income guarantee could take the job and see their after tax income
rise from $200 to $325 a week without risking that they won't be able to get
their benefits back if they have to quit their job. The basic income guarantee
ensures that the more one works the more one makes while ensuring that no one
fears complete destitution.
People who believe inadequate human
capital causes poverty might voice qualified approval of BIG. It does not treat
the cause, but it effectively treats the symptom. It does little to directly
enhance human capital, simply giving people enough money to meet their
subsistence needs. However, they might find something appealing in the approach
because it would allow people more time to allocate to attempts to enhance
their levels of human capital. If people were assured that their subsistence
needs would be met whether they worked or not, they would be in a position to
devote more of their time to training and other activities which would increase
their levels of human capital. Such a person would have more opportunity to
increase her human capital than a minimum wage worker today who would have to
work two jobs to keep a family of three above the poverty line leaving little
time available for her to increase her skills. Also, the basic income guarantee
could be combined with increased job training, placement, and educational
funding. This combination would be superior to workfare because it would offer
both a long-term and a short-term solution to poverty caused by inadequate
human capital.
The strongest opposition to the
guaranteed income is likely to come from the perspective that a lack of work
ethic causes poverty. Some might make this argument directly, others
indirectly.
The strongest resistance to the
basic income guarantee would come from people who directly contend that the
lack of a work ethic causes poverty. They would say that a policy providing
enough money for people's basic needs would result in a severe work
disincentive. We would not be able to get enough people to work to create the
things needed to sustain us as a society.
This is an important objection.
However, there are three problems with it. First, it relies on a very strong
and unrealistic assumption about people's aversion to work. Second, it relies
on an extreme and one-sided version of the work ethic. Third, it ignores the
incentive effects on businesses. These arguments are supported in the following
discussion.
Unlike the present system, the
guaranteed income would always provide an incentive for people to work and earn
more if they could, because no matter what a person earned they would always be
better off earning more. The guaranteed income is a lump sum transfer (the poor
receive it as a grant, others receive it as a tax deduction) and so itself
causes no inefficiency; inefficiency could only be caused by collecting taxes
to support it. It has a work disincentive only in the sense that one is not
completely destitute if one does not work, but it counters that with a
significant reward if someone does work.
As mentioned above, the incentive to
work for a person receiving a guaranteed income removes some work disincentives
that many of our current anti-poverty programs have. TANF, food stamps,
unemployment insurance, even public housing are all very difficult to qualify
for. However, if something is difficult to obtain, it is risky to give it up.
In a guaranteed income system a worker takes no risk when he takes a job. This
would greatly reduce the “cycle of dependency” problem.
A supporter of the “bad values” view
of poverty might respond using the extreme version of the work ethic:
able-bodied persons are obligated to work for their subsistence. Those who hold
this view tend to be ambivalent about or to oppose poverty policies that
provide able-bodied poor people with assistance without requiring them to work
for it (Mead, 1986).
We are neither ambivalent about nor
opposed to such policies. As we have said it is one sided to hold individuals
who do not own property to a moral obligation to work without holding society
to a reciprocal moral obligation. There are two ways to solve this
inconsistency. Either increase the moral obligation of employers (as the
minimum wage and public jobs attempt to do) or decrease the moral obligation on
the part of workers. We believe the second is more effective because the belief
that large numbers of people will not work even if offered a good wage relies
on an unrealistic assumption about human behavior—believing in a world in which
every man does not have his price. On the whole people will work if given
incentive to do so, and people are happier and better workers if they chose to work rather than if they are forced to work. Remember as cited above,
that 5.3% of the labor force in 2002 lived in poverty (U.S. Department of
Labor/Bureau of Statistics). Since some of those who made up this 5.3% were
actually working, instead of simply looking for work, this implies that some
Americans had such a strong work ethic that they were willing to work even
though they had little pecuniary incentive to do so. Even before TANF, when
AFDC had no time limits, most recipients were off public assistance in less
than three years. The times and places where one does see a “cycle of
dependency” tend to be where there are few opportunities in the private sector
(Handler and Hasenfeld, 1997).
Recall that neither Keynesian nor
Neoclassical theory necessarily imply that the labor market will provide above
poverty wages for everyone who wants to work. Recall that in
the absence of redistribution workers are desperate to work, but employers are
not as desperate for workers, causing a tendency for low wages in the least
skilled labor markets—which effectively holds them to an obligation to work.
Although BIG provides a supplement for non-workers and workers alike, it gives
low-wage workers the market power to command higher wages. If, as people so
often fear, a large number of low wage workers attempted to quit their jobs to
live off of the minimum income, the market would respond with higher wages to
coax them back to work. Even if wages did not rise
enough that everyone would chose to work, wages would rise enough so that the
hard working would be significantly better off than they are under the current
system and significantly better off than those who lived off the minimum
income.
Many people make the values argument
indirectly, saying that because the work ethic is so strong in our society, we
should advocate poverty policies that are consistent with it. A guaranteed
income is not consistent with the work ethic because it provides people with
"something for nothing." For this reason, even if a guaranteed income
plan were to be enacted, the income guarantee would not be set high enough to
meet subsistence needs. Politicians and the public would not be willing to give
non-working people a lot of governmental assistance. A poverty policy that
involved the government in the creation of public sector jobs would not run
into this problem. Poor persons who took these jobs would be working for their
subsistence, and politicians and the public would be willing to reward them
with higher income than would be the case under a basic income guarantee. The
implication is that due to our societal adherence to the work ethic, public
assistance beneficiaries would end up better off under a public employment
scheme than a guaranteed income plan.
We agree that politicians and the
public might be willing to give more money under a public employment approach
than under a BIG approach. This does not necessarily mean, however, that
recipients would receive more money or would be better off. As we argued above,
the public employment approach is very expensive. Taxpayers must be willing to
give not only more, but enough more to cover the added expense of supervisors,
materials, and all the other overhead costs of the public employment program.
And covering all these costs would still leave the externalities discussed
earlier unaccounted for. Public jobs are likely to be so much more expensive
and involve so many more costs that do not directly benefit recipients that it
is doubtful whether people would be willing to give enough more to make sure
that recipients would actually receive more wages than they would under the
guaranteed income. Even if they did, they still might not be better off because
work is a costly activity to the working individuals themselves. With work
often comes with travel costs, childcare costs, and other costs. The money used
to purchase these cannot be used to purchase food, shelter, clothing, and other
goods/services. If these things are taken into account, wages would have to be significantly higher before we could say
that recipients would be better off with a guaranteed job than a basic income
guarantee.
CONCLUSION
The other programs we have considered all require the government to spend large amounts of money on things other than direct payments to the poor. This is an inefficiency in itself, and it causes the second inefficiency of making errors possible by allowing people to fall through the cracks. The basic income guarantee makes a simple, effective payment system to the people who need it without wasting funds on anything else, and it has no cracks to fall through. Therefore, if we want to make fighting poverty the central goal of poverty policy, the basic income guarantee is the most efficient way to do it.
We believe that the biggest barrier to a more effective
poverty policy is a desire to judge the poor, but our judgments of the poor
hurt a lot of good people. At the time of this writing, states across the nation have
been under the new welfare regime for about seven years. This
law
requires those on welfare to work in return for benefits, and it limits the
amount of time recipients are eligible to receive benefits to five years over
their entire lifetimes (Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, 1996b).
We
are doubtful that this approach will do much to curtail poverty. In fact, it
might actually exacerbate it. As more people are pushed off the welfare rolls, they
will face increased pressure to compete in the labor market, putting downward
pressure on wages. Thus, at best, the result of the welfare reform law might
simply be to swell the ranks of the working poor, who have already seen their
living standard stagnate for the last 25 years despite continued economic
growth and great substantial increases in living standards for the higher
classes.
Someone who believes that the value of work is that it can provide workers with a better life, would be distressed by this. It is not necessary to have poverty, especially among workers in a country as rich as the U.S. If the goal is to eliminate poverty, the basic income guarantee is an efficient and comprehensive means. In the end, the issue is a normative one. Should our society be so committed to the work ethic that we force the poor to work even at poverty wages? No, eliminating poverty is so important that everyone deserves the resources required to meet their basic needs. If we say yes to that question we are putting enforcement of a very strong version of the work ethic ahead of our shared desire to have an economy that provides a decent life for everyone. There is plenty of room for work incentives by providing good jobs without making people face desperate poverty. We should reward the work ethic, not enforce the work ethic.
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[1] Medical care, though important to
one’s standard of living, we treat as a separate issue. One related problem
that we will not be discussing in this paper is someone who is impoverished
because of health expenses owed by
them or a member of their family for a condition that does not prevent them
from working. Providing adequate affordable
health care to all citizens is an important public policy question, but it is
best addressed as a separate issue.
[2] The term work is being used as
it often is in neoclassical economics: time spent doing something one is paid a
wage for. Nonmarket labor, such taking care of children is not considered work
from this point of view. Just because something is not considered work, as
economists define it, does not mean that it is not socially valuable. For
example, someone raising their kid but not getting paid for it is, arguably,
engaging in a more highly valued activity than someone building bombs for a
wage.
[3] This question might be answered
empirically, if the two are introduced simultaneously and the authority
experiments with different wage rates and different basic income guarantee
levels to find out if the wage needed to encourage workers to switch is greater
than their productivity.